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Jennifer Daskal*
Our personal data is everywhere and anywhere, moving across
national borders in ways that defy normal expectations of how things
and people travel from PointA to Point B. Yet, whereas data transitsthe
globe without any intrinsicties to territory, the governments that seek to
access or regulate this data operate with territorial-basedlimits. This
Article tackles the inherent tension between how governments and data
operate, the jurisdictionalconflicts that have emerged, and the power
that has been delegated to the multinationalcorporationsthat manage
our data across borders as a result. It does so through the lens of the
highly contested and often conflicting approaches to the jurisdictional
reach of law enforcement over data, the so-called right to be forgotten,
and a range of other privacy regulations-engaging in an in-depth
analysis as to how these issues are playing out across both Europe and
the United States.
In so doing, the Article highlights the flaws with the
straightforward application of old jurisdictional rules onto the new
medium of data-taking on recent scholarship on this issue. And it
shines a spotlight on the unilateralrulemaking by powerful states and
the powerful multinational companies that manage our data, which in
turn puts private, multinational companies increasingly in control of
whose rules govern and thus the substance of both privacy and speech
rights on a global, or near-global, basis.
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INTRODUCTION

Our personal data is everywhere and anywhere, moving across
national borders in ways that defy normal expectations of how things
and people travel from Point A to Point B. Yet, whereas data transits
the globe without any intrinsic ties to territory, the governments that
seek to access or regulate this data operate with territorial-based limits.
This basic dichotomy between how governments and data operate is
leading to an increasing number of jurisdictional conflicts, incentivizing
data localization mandates as a means of asserting territorial control
(and thus ensuring access to and regulatory power over sought-after
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data), and raising normative questions about how to draw the line
between what is territorial and what is extraterritorial in the
regulation of a predominantly unterritorial medium.
The key debates are in some ways familiar. As the internet grew
in the 1990s, there was a lively dispute between the unterritorialists,
such as Professor David Post,I and the territorialists, such as Professors
Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, 2 about whether the internet would defy
territorial regulations (the unterritorialists) or whether it would
increasingly succumb to longstanding jurisdictional rules and
territorial-based controls (the territorialists). History has sided with
the territorialists. The new system of international governance that the
unterritorialists both predicted and advocated for has not come to pass. 3
To the contrary, states 4 have increasingly found ways to regulate and
compel production of data that passes through their borders and to use
new technology (such as location-based filtering mechanisms) and new
mandates (such as data location requirements) to increase territorialbased controls. This is as Goldsmith and Wu predicted. 5
But as this Article explores, the cross-border effects of the
competing jurisdictional claims are in many ways more contested,
fraught, and consequential than Goldsmith and Wu recognized. True,
new supranational institutions have not come to exist; rather,
territorial-based controls are the norm. But whereas Goldsmith and Wu
applauded these developments as promoting decentralized, democratic
decisionmaking, the increasingly extraterritorial effects of territorialbased regulation defy this assumption of local, democratic
accountability.
Moreover, the debate of the 1990s failed to account for the role
of private, third-party providers in setting the rules. Operating
alongside the territorial governments-and sometimes displacing
them-are the major multinational companies that manage our data.
These corporations play an increasingly critical role in mediating
disputes across borders and in determining, interpreting, and
administering the rules that apply. When Mark Zuckerberg, CEO and
cofounder of Facebook, said, "[i]n a lot of ways Facebook is more like a
1.
See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-the Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
2.
See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD (2006).

3.
See Johnson & Post, supranote 1, at 1368, 1372-73 (warning that regulators would "lose
their battle to impose local regulations").
4.
For the purposes of this Article, I use the term "state" to refer to an independent,
sovereign, self-governing political entity that is recognized by the international community as
such.
5.

See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 2.
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government than a traditional company," he was not exaggerating.6
The multinational companies that manage our data have taken on a
form of international governance in ways that traditional governments
can't and won't. And while analogies can be made to the power yielded
by other multinational corporate operations, such as in the banking, oil
and gas, and manufacturing industries, there is something different
and profound about the role of private tech companies in setting the
scope of our privacy, speech, and associational rights. Whereas the early
debates presented a fairly binary choice between territorial
governmental control and the development of new supranational
entities and norms, the reality that has emerged is much messier and
more complicated.
This Article examines these developments through the highly
contested and often conflicting approaches to the jurisdictional reach of
law enforcement over data, the so-called right to be forgotten, and
European Union privacy regulations.7 Each of these areas is contested,
evolving, and highly important to the scope of privacy and speech rights
on a global or near-global scale. The scope of cross-border law
enforcement jurisdiction has been the source of high-stakes litigation
and policy discussions in both the United States and European Union,
as well as in numerous other nations. The European Commission, for
example, has been tasked with defining jurisdictional norms for
determining law enforcement access to data;8 the state parties to the
Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime (the "Budapest
6.
See FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 61
(2017) (quoting Mark Zuckerberg).
7.
There are numerous additional areas where these debates are arising, including, for
example, with respect to intelligence surveillance, tax policy, and tort law. See, e.g., CYBERCRIME
CONVENTION COMM. (T-CY), COUNCIL OF EUR., CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE IN THE CLOUD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE T-CY: FINAL REPORT OF

THE
T-CY
CLOUD
EVIDENCE
GROUP
7-8
(Sept.
16,
2016),
http://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentld=0900
0016806a495e [https://perma.cc/C5JB-D3U4] [hereinafter CEG REPORT] (describing ways in which
a service provider "may be under different layers of jurisdictions for various legal aspects related
to its service at the same time"). But the three areas at issue here-law enforcement access to
data, regulation of content, and the broader efforts to regulate the treatment of personal dataare themselves sufficiently broad and complex to highlight some of the key, competing pressures
and normative interests at stake. Together, they exemplify some of the foundational issues about
what constitutes a territorial versus extraterritorial exercise of enforcement or regulatory
authority, how to think about the sovereign interests at stake, and the role of third-party
intermediaries in resolving or, in some cases dictating, the answers to these questions.
8.
See Council Conclusions on Improving Criminal Justice in Cyberspace, COUNCIL EUR.
UNION
3-5
(June
9,
2016),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/
jha/2016/06/Cyberspace-EN-pdf/ [https://perma.cc/D96E-5F4K]. The Commission's non-paper
and related technical document was presented in June 2017. See Improving Cross-Border Access
to Electronic Evidence: Findings from the Expert Process and Suggested Way Forward, EUR.
COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/docs/pages/20170522_nonpaper-electronic evidence en.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) [https://perma.cclKA9F-DDK5].
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Convention") have adopted a new guidance note and are considering a
possible new protocol regarding the appropriate scope of enforcement
jurisdiction over certain types of data;9 and the United States and
United Kingdom have negotiated a draft agreement to facilitate access
to data across borders, something that the U.K. Deputy National
Security Adviser has testified about twice in Congress and that Prime
Minister Teresa May has described as one of her top priorities vis-a-vis
the United States.10
Meanwhile, decisions from courts such as the European Court of
Justice regarding the right to be forgotten raise weighty questions
about the reach of territorial regulation with extraterritorial effect,
such as whose conception of speech rights govern and who decides."
The manner in which the right has both been challenged and
implemented also highlights both the explicit and implicit power of
private corporations to determine the scope of privacy and speech rights
and to mediate normative disputes across borders. Broader regulatory
efforts in the EU and elsewhere provide additional examples of states
seeking to impose their privacy and other related rules on a near-global

9.
See Cybercrime Convention Comm. (T-CY), T-CY Guidance Note #10 Production Orders
for Subscriber Information (Article 18 Budapest Convention), COUNCIL EUR. 1-9 (Nov. 15, 2016),
https://rm.coe.int/16806f943e [https://perma.cc/3F8N-AFJ6] [hereinafter Cybercrime Convention
Comm. Guidance]; see also Cybercrime Convention Comm. (T-CY), (Draft) Terms of Reference for
the Preparationof a Draft 2nd Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime,
COUNCIL EUR. (June 1, 2017), https://rm.coe.int/-draft-terms-of-reference-for-the-preparation-of-a[hereinafter
Cybercrime
[https://perma.cc/Y25E-3D6K]
draft-2nd-additiona/16807lb794
Convention Comm. Proposal]; Cybercrime, Towards a Protocol on Evidence in the Cloud, COUNCIL
EUR. PORTAL (June 8, 2017), https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/-/cybercrime-towards-aprotocol-on-evidence-in-the-cloud [https://perma.cc/86U9-RKA2] [hereinafter Cybercrimel.
10. See Data Stored Abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection in the Digital
Era: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (June 15, 2017) (written
Adviser,
U.K.),
Security
Deputy
National
Paddy
McGuiness,
statement
of
https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/McGuinness-Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XS6Y-A2DB]; Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime and
Terrorism, 115th Cong. (May 10, 2017) (written testimony of Paddy McGuiness, Deputy National
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05-24Adviser,
U.K.),
Security
17%2OMcGuinness%2OTestimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSK8-MLNX]; International Conflicts of
Law Concerning Cross Border Data Flow and Law Enforcement Requests: HearingBefore the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 9-14 (2016) (statement of David Bitkower, Principal Deputy
Assistant
Att'y
Gen.,
Criminal
Division,
Department
of
Justice),
Ellen
[https://perma.cc/MU72-LR5U];
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/828686/download
Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, The British Want to Come to America-With Wiretap Orders and
Search Warrants, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/the-british-want-to-come-to-america-with-wiretap-orders-and-search-warrants/2016/
02/04/b351ce9e-ca86-11e5-a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html?utm-term=.b3b46c7c27b
[https://perma.cc/4BXU-ADS8].
11. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD)
(May
13,
2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
(Google
Spain
Case)
documentprint.jsfdoclang-EN&text=&pagelndex=0&docid=152065&cid=244711
[https://perma.cc/PDU5-VUT7].
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scale-again mediated by the major multinational corporations that
manage our data. 12
This Article then draws out the implications from the case
studies. Specifically, it identifies and defends three key takeaways that
flow from an examination of the key disputes. First, the unique features
of data challenge previously relatively stable assessments of what is
territorial and what is extraterritorial. 13 And despite the claims of
some, these challenges cannot be resolved by simply pointing to
preexisting bodies of law (which are themselves contested and
unsettled) in analogous areas of intellectual property or money. 14 Or at
least they cannot be resolved in a particularly normative and practically
satisfying way. The question is not just, "how have others resolved
similar issues in loosely analogous situations in the past?" but rather,
"how should we answer these questions, particularly when such
important considerations of personal privacy, individual autonomy,
speech rights, and security are at stake?"

12. I am hardly the first scholar to explore this phenomenon. See, e.g., Anu Bradford, The
Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2012); Austin L. Parrish, Reclaiming InternationalLaw from
Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815 (2009); Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social
Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy
Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2000). This Article seeks to shine additional light on how this
phenomenon is playing out with respect to law enforcement access issues and regulation of privacy
rights, including in just the short time since these earlier articles were published.
13. For a sampling of the relevant literature and ongoing debates, see PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN,
&

GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012); GOLDSMITH

WU, supra note 2; Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, PersonalJurisdictionand Choice of
Law in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313 (2013); Jennifer Daskal, The Un-territorialityof Data, 125
YALE L.J. 326, 365-78 (2015); Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement
Jurisdictionon the Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (2017); Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data
Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729 (2016); and Orin Kerr & Sean D. Murphy, Government
Hacking to Light the Dark Web: What Risks to InternationalRelations and InternationalLaw?, 70
STAN.

L.

REV.

ONLINE

58

(2017),

https://review.law.stanford.edulwp-

&

content/uploads/sites/3/2017/07/70-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-58-Kerr-Murphy.pdf
[https://perma.cclXJ48-75K3].
14. Cf. Woods, supra note 13, at 748-66 (asserting that there is nothing particularly unique
about the efforts to regulate data). Contrary to Woods' claims, see Woods, supra note 13, at 755, I
do not, and have never, suggested that data falls outside of nation-state-and thus largely
territorial-based-attempts to control. In fact, my project over the past several years has been to
define the jurisdictional reach of domestic law enforcement over the data that they are seeking to
access. In other words, I presume nation-state, and thus territory-based, efforts to access, regulate,
and control data, and seek to think through the nation-states' jurisdictional reach and how the
particular features of data challenge those efforts. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement
Access to Data Across Borders: The Evolving Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT'L SECURITY L.
POL'Y 473 (2016); Daskal, supra note 13, at 365-78; Jennifer Daskal & Andrew K. Woods, Congress
Should Embrace the DOJ's Cross-Border Data Fix, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 1, 2016, 8:03 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/32213/congress-embrace-dojs-cross-border-data-fix/
[https://perma.cc/2AWT-Z5NB]; Jennifer Daskal, The Microsoft Warrant Case: The Policy Issues,
AM. CONST. Soc'Y FOR L. & POL'Y (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-microsoftwarrant-case-the-policy-issues [https://perma.cclL9NB-UWAS].
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Second, the transnational nature of both data and the companies
that regulate our data means territorial regulations are increasingly
having an outsized extraterritorial effect, yielding the kind of global or
near-global standard-setting that the unterritorialists once predicted,
but via local action. This in turn challenges the territorialists'
normative defense of such decentralized lawmaking as an example of
democratically accountable decisionmaking that promotes selfdetermination.
Third, and relatedly, this phenomenon is largely being mediated
by the private parties that hold and manage our data. It is these
companies that increasingly determine whose rules govern and, in key
ways, how they are interpreted and applied.1 5 In doing so, they set the
scope of privacy and speech rights on an international scale. As a result,
the key relationship is not between just the governments and the
persons that they govern, but instead a set of dynamic interactions
between governments, the governed, and the multinational companies
that manage our data and mediate between governments. This is a new
phenomenon: the role and power of these third-party players were
neither anticipated nor accounted for in the more stylized debates of the
1990s. And it is a phenomenon that has significant implications for both
substantive and procedural rights.
Two final observations. First, although I focus primarily on how
these issues are playing out in the United States and European Union,
I do not intend to suggest that these are the only important players.
Rather, these are issues being dealt with by just about every nation in
the world, with different approaches taken in places like Russia and
China than in the United States and European Union. 16 But the United
States and European Union provide an important, interesting, and
instructive place to start. They are large and powerful actors. And while
they sometimes take divergent approaches, they share enough common
values and normative assumptions that there is both the possibility and
reality of increased harmonization in key areas. They thus make
informative case studies.
Second, lest anyone should think that these are just wonky
jurisdictional questions that have little import beyond the four corners
of conflicts or choice of law textbooks, let me provide a reminder of the
implications. In a world where data moves rapidly around the globe,
often in ways totally unknown or even unconceivable to the average
individual, the answers to these jurisdictional questions often

15. See infra Section I.A.
16. I hope and plan in future work to engage in an exploration of how these issues are playing
out in a wider range of countries as well.
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determine not just government's ability to access or manage data, but
the rights and protections that apply. In determining who gets to set
the rules, the jurisdictional rules indirectly determine the scope of one's
privacy, associational, and speech rights. Put simply, those basic
jurisdictional questions have a profound implication for the balance of
power. And they matter to our security, to our privacy, to business and
economic interests, to citizens' relationship with their governments, to
the prospects for democratic accountability, and to our understanding
of and ability to shape policy going forward.
I. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO DATA ACROSS BORDERS
The question of how to square the territorial-based rules
governing law enforcement jurisdiction over data with the
unterritorial-and in key ways unique-features of data is a difficult
one, and has been the subject of a handful of high-stakes court cases,
diplomatic discussions, and policy debates over the past several years.17
As the Cybercrime Convention's Cloud Evidence Group recently put it,
"a major challenge of cloud computing is that data is not stable but often
distributed over and moving between different services, providers,
locations and jurisdictions, while law enforcement powers are usually
defined territorially." 18
To date, answers to the key jurisdictional questions vary
depending on the government seeking to access the data, the type of
data at issue, and the perspective of the judges that oversee many of
the requests. To complicate matters, several nations prohibit domesticbased providers from disclosing certain locally held data to foreign
governments, whereas several (and sometimes the same) nations assert
the authority to compel production of data that is extraterritorially
located, thereby creating an increasingly potent conflict of laws.
The following highlights some of the different approaches,
looking first at law enforcement efforts to access data from the thirdparty companies that control it, and second, at the related but
somewhat different issues that arise when law enforcement itself seeks
to directly access data as opposed to compelling a third party to do so.
A. Compelled Disclosure Orders
The question of who has the authority to compel production of
data for law enforcement purposes has implications for, among other

17.
18.

See infra Sections IA, I.B.
See CEG REPORT, supra note 7, at 17.
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things, privacy, security, the future development of the internet, and
principles of sovereignty. I start by looking at two very divergent
approaches to the scope of permissible compelled disclosure-the
location-driven approach, as exemplified by the increasingly disputed
approach taken by the Second Circuit in the Microsoft Ireland case, and
the just-about-anything-is-covered approach taken by the Belgian
courts in the Skype and Yahoo! cases. I then turn to the more nuanced
efforts to redefine jurisdictional rules in ways that seek to better
account for the underlying interests at stake.
1. The Location-Driven Approach: Microsoft Ireland
In June 2016, the Second Circuit issued its ruling in the so-called
Microsoft Ireland case.1 9 The case dates to December 2013, when the
U.S. government obtained a warrant pursuant to the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), which compelled Microsoft to
turn over data that was located on a server in Dublin, Ireland, but could
be accessed by Microsoft employees located in Redmond, Washington. 20
Microsoft objected-arguing that the U.S. government has no authority
to demand the production of data located outside the United States'
borders. 21 According to Microsoft, this was an impermissible
extraterritorial exercise of the government's warrant authority. The
government fought back, arguing that Microsoft could access the data
from Redmond, Washington, and therefore that this was a territorial,
not an extraterritorial, exercise of its authority. The government
analogized the warrant to a compelled disclosure order issued pursuant
to a subpoena.22
Both the magistrate and district court judges sided with the
government.23 But the Second Circuit reversed.24 The argument
proceeded in three key steps. First, the Second Circuit concluded, as
both parties agreed, that the ECPA, the underlying statute, did not
have extraterritorial effect. Second, the court ascertained the primary

19. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account
Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp.) (Microsoft Ireland), 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016),
reh'g denied, Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search Certain E-Mail Account
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 855 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2017) (en banc).
20. Microsoft Ireland, 829 F.3d at 200.
21. Id. at 209.
22. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev'd, Microsoft Ireland, 829 F.3d 466; In re
Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft
Corporation, No. 13-MJ-2814, 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2014).
23. In re Warrant, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 466.
24. Microsoft Ireland, 829 F.3d at 222.
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"focus" of the statute as being about protecting privacy. 25 And third, the
Second Circuit ruled that the privacy intrusion occurred at the place
where the data was located and thus seized-in this case, Ireland. 26
The Second Circuit thus established the following rule: U.S. law
enforcement's authority to compel stored communications content, via
a warrant issued pursuant to the ECPA, extends only to data located
within the United States. If law enforcement seeks communications
content located outside the United States, it needs to make a mutual
legal assistance request to the foreign government of the territory
where the data is located and await that government's response (or
access it by other means). This is so even if the crime, victim, and target
of the investigation are all located in the United States. It is so even if
the only foreign government link is that the data happens to be held in
the foreign government's territory for tax or other economic reasons,
such as lower energy costs. And it is so even if there is no way for the
government to ascertain the specific location of the data, and thus no
clarity about where to direct the request for mutual legal assistance.
As I have written elsewhere, this single-minded focus on data
location as determinative of law enforcement jurisdiction is hard to
justify even under the court's own reasoning. 27 First, even if the Second
Circuit is right that the focus of the statute is on privacy, it is not at all
clear that the privacy intrusion occurs in Ireland as opposed to the
United States. The United States government is not accessing the data
in Ireland; Microsoft is. But Microsoft already has access to the data as
its caretaker and in fact moves it around without notice to or control by
the user. 28 Any additional privacy intrusion occurs when the data is
shared with the U.S. government (which would occur in the United
States), not when transferred from Ireland to the United States. 29 This
25. Id. at 217, 220-21 (applying the analysis set out by the Supreme Court in Morrison v.
Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266-70 (2010)). For critiques of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, see, e.g., Zachary T. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality,94 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2014); Anthony J. Colangelo, Essay, What is Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1323 (2014) (emphasizing that "'territorial' and
'extraterritorial' are fluid constructs subject to conceptual manipulation"); and William S. Dodge,
Understandingthe PresumptionAgainst Extraterritoriality,16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 112-24
(1998).
26. Microsoft Ireland, 829 F.3d at 217, 220-21.
27. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, The DangerousImplications of the Microsoft Ireland Case, JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2016, 1:24 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/33577/dangerous-implicationsmicrosoft-ireland-case [https://perma.cc/7QSP-GX3X].
28. See, e.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redacted]@gmail.com, No. 16-mj-00757
(BAH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130153, at *5-7 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017) (emphasizing that email
service providers-in this case Google-regularly transfer data from server to server without
notice to the user).
29. See Jennifer Daskal, Congress Needs to Fix Our OutdatedEmail PrivacyLaw, SLATE (Jan.
26,
2017,
1:17
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future-tense/
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is a key point, and one that I will return to later. It highlights, among
other things, the increased power of third-party providers in managing
personal data and thus determining the rules that apply.
Second, it is not at all clear that the Second Circuit's ruling
advances the privacy interests the court seeks to protect. 30 After all, the
government proceeded by a warrant based on probable cause. There is
no question that the government would have been able to compel
disclosure of that data had it been stored in the United States, and that
there would be no privacy violation, absent some problem with the
warrant. It does not become a privacy violation simply because data
moved elsewhere. In fact, the case arguably undercuts, rather than
enhances, privacy. The United States now needs to make a diplomatic
request for data, via the mutual legal assistance process, every time it
seeks data located in a foreign jurisdiction. The relevant foreign
government, should it choose to respond, then accesses the data
according to its own substantive and procedural standards. But most
foreign government rules governing law enforcement access to stored
communications content are less privacy protective than the United
States' requirement of probable cause and independent judicial
review. 31 The ruling potentially pushes law enforcement requestseven for U.S. citizens' and residents' data-into less protective systems,
simply based on where the data happens to be held.32
This data location-driven approach to determining law
enforcement jurisdiction also leads to a range of concerning policy
implications. Most importantly, it significantly undercuts U.S. law
enforcement's ability to access sought-after evidence, even in situations
where there is probable cause to do so, and even when the target of the
investigation is located in the United States and properly subject to U.S.
law enforcement jurisdiction. Rather than directly accessing data from
2017/01/the confusing-court caseovermicrosoft data-on-servers inireland.html
[https://perma.cclD2YR-NUZU].
30. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14-18, United States v. Microsoft, No. 17-2-01 (U.S.
June 23, 2017) (making a forceful argument that the Second Circuit erred in defining the focus of
the relevant statute as being about protecting privacy); Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En
Banc at 11-17, Microsoft v. United States, No. 14-2985 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Petition
for Rehearing] (same).
31. See, e.g., Peter Swire & DeBrae Kennedy-Mayo, How Both the EU and the U.S. are
"Stricter"Than Each Other for the Privacy of Government Requests for Information, 66 EMORY L.J.
617, 617-23, 642-48 (2017).
32. The one way the ruling promotes privacy is by placing numerous roadblocks in the way
of the government accessing data, thereby leading to a reduction in what law enforcement can
obtain. But it does so based on the arbitrary fact of where the data is located, not on any normative
determination that the kind of data sought should be protected. Were the data physically in the
United States, just about everyone would agree that it could be lawfully obtained pursuant to a
warrant based on probable cause, and that there would be no privacy violation in doing soassuming there were an accurate and legitimate finding of probable cause.
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the U.S.-based companies that control it, the ruling requires law
enforcement to make a diplomatic request for sought-after data
employing the mutual legal assistance process. But the United States
has mutual legal assistance treaties ("MLATs") with only about onethird of the world's countries. 33 In some cases, the sought-after data
may be held in a country with which the United States does not have
an MLAT in place and has no other workable means of accessing the
data. Moreover, even when there is an MLAT in place, the lengthy
response times mean that even if there is the possibility of accessing
the sought-after data, it may not be provided in time for it to be useful. 34
Of particular concern, in some situations there is no country that
has jurisdiction to access the sought-after data. Google's systems, for
example, are (as of the time of this writing) designed so that only its
U.S.-based team can access sought-after data. Let's assume that U.S.
law enforcement serves a warrant on Google for a certain email account.
If some or all of the data is outside the United States, Google cannot
lawfully respond according to the Second Circuit ruling. 35 Yet, if the
data is located outside the United States, the relevant foreign
government does not have jurisdiction over the people who can access
the data, since all such personnel are located in the United States. As a
result, there may not be any country with jurisdiction to compel
production of sought-after data, even in the investigation of serious
crimes. 36
In recognition of this reality, numerous district and magistrate
judges, sitting across multiple districts, have disagreed with the Second
Circuit's ruling and come out the other way in cases involving Google
and Yahoo!. 37 These lower courts have ordered Google and Yahoo! to

33.

See

Treaties,

Agreements,

and

Asset

Sharing,

U.S.

DEP'T

ST.,

https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol2/222469.htm
(last visited
Oct.
18, 2017)
[https://perma.ccl5YX6-J5ME] (listing countries with which the United States currently has an
MLAT in place).
34. See, e.g., Jonah Force Hill, Problematic Alternatives: MLAT Reform for the DigitalAge,
HARV. NATL SECURITY J. (Jan. 28, 2015, 1:05 PM), http://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematicalternatives-mlat-reform-for-the-digital-age [https://perma.cc/ZML9-KB7B] (noting that it often
takes months if not years for foreign governments to respond to MILAT requests).
35. Microsoft Ireland, 829 F.3d 197, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Petition for Rehearing,
supra note 30, at 17-19 (making this point).
36. See In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 719 (E.D. Pa.
2017) (disagreeing with the Second Circuit, ordering Google to disclose extraterritorially located
data, and relying in part on concerns that there would be no alternative means for the government
to access that data); see also Petition for Rehearing, supra note 30, at 17-19 (emphasizing the
inability to access certain data from Google).
37. See, e.g., In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., No. 17-mj-532, slip op. at 23 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 1, 2017); In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1 to Google, No. 16-960, 2017 WL 3535037, at
*11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017), aff'g 232 F. Supp. 3d 708 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2017); In re Search of
Content Stored at Premises Controlled by Google Inc., No. 16-mc-80263, 2017 WL 3478809, at *5
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disclose communications content located outside the United States in
response to warrants based on probable cause. Lower court judges have
disagreed with the Second Circuit both about the relevant focus of the
statute (concluding that it is about disclosure, not privacy) and about
the locus of any privacy violation (in the United States when turned
over to law enforcement, not where it is accessed). 38 Various judges
have also emphasized the practical problems created, particularly in
situations where data is constantly being moved around and there is no
stable single location. 39
In October 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the
Microsoft Irelandcase. 40 The fact that the Supreme Court took the case
even in the absence of a circuit split highlights its perceived importance.
But there is reason to hope, however, that Congress steps in and
ultimately moots the case before the Court. 4 1 Specifically, Congress
should clarify that the warrant authority under the ECPA is not limited
based on the location of the data. Yet, it should also ensure respect for
the countervailing interests of foreign governments in controlling
access to their own citizens' and residents' data-much as the United
States would (and should) demand if foreign governments sought to
access U.S. residents' and citizens' data. 4 2 1 return to this issue in Part
III.
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017), aff'g 2017 WL 1487625 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017); In re Search of Info.
Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No.
16-mj-757, 2017 WL 3445634, at *27 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017), affg 2017 WL 2480752 (D.D.C. June
2, 2017); In re Search of Info. Associated with Accounts Identified as [redacted]@gmail.com, No.
16-mj-2197, 2017 WL 3263351, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2017); In re Search Warrant to Google,
Inc., No. 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *12 (D.N.J. July 10, 2017); In re Two Email Accounts
Stored at Google, Inc., No. 17-M-1235, 2017 WL 2838156, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 30, 2017); In re
Search of Premises Located at [Redacted]@yahoo.com, No. 17-mj-1238, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Fla. Apr.
7, 2017). Decisions have noted that the location of data at any given moment was the consequence
of an algorithmic decision untethered to user location. Decisions have also highlighted the
impossibility of lawfully accessing certain information via diplomatic channels, given the way
Google has designed its system. See, e.g., In re Search Warrant, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 725 (noting that
"if the court were to adopt Google's interpretation of the Microsoft decision and apply such a
rationale to the case at bar, it would be impossible for the Government to obtain the sought-after
user data through existing MLAT channels").
38. See supra note 37.
39. See, e.g., In re Search of Content, 2017 WL 3478809, at *4; In re Search Warrant No. 16960-M-01, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 724-25.
40. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-2, 2017 WL 2869958, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017).
41. See Jennifer Daskal, There's No Good Decision in the Microsoft Ireland Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/opinion/data-abroad-privacy-court.html
[https://perma.cc/TH47-JMZN]; Jennifer Daskal, Whose Law Governs in a Borderless World?,
NAT'L CONST. CTR. (May 9, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/whose-law-governs-in-aborderless-world [https://perma.cc/CE86-L9M7].
42. In fact, even the Second Circuit Judge who authored the opinion has urged Congress to
step in. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 855 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2017) ("It is overdue for a congressional revision that
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2. The Belgian Approach: Give Us Everything
The approach taken by the Belgian courts in two recent casesone involving Yahoo! and a second involving Skype-marks a sharp
contrast to the location-driven approach taken by the Second Circuit in
the Microsoft Ireland case. It too, is troubling, albeit for different
reasons.
The dispute with Yahoo! began in November 2007 when Belgian
authorities sought IP and email addresses as well as other information
that would assist in the identification of particular individuals in a
computer fraud case. Yahoo! refused to comply, and the company was
prosecuted, convicted, and fined fifty-five thousand Euros in damages,
plus an additional ten thousand Euros for each day it failed to provide
the sought-after data. 43 Yahoo! appealed, making three key arguments.
First, Yahoo! argued it was neither an electronic communication
network nor a provider of electronic communication services and thus
that it was outside the scope of the applicable Belgian statute. Second,
Yahoo! argued that, as a U.S. company that lacked any presence in
Belgium, the applicable Belgian statute did not apply. And third,
Yahoo! argued that even if it were covered by the statute, the production
order constituted an impermissible extraterritorial application of
Belgian enforcement jurisdiction. 44
After a lengthy set of appeals, the Belgian Supreme Court
rejected all of Yahoo!'s arguments and upheld the conviction.
Specifically, it ruled that Yahoo! was a provider of electronic
communication services that fell within the relevant statute. It further
concluded that the statutory disclosure obligations cover "any operator
or provider that actively aims its economic activities on [Belgian]

&

&

would continue to protect privacy but would more effectively balance concerns of international
comity with law enforcement needs and service provider obligations in the global context in which
this case arose."); see also In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2017) (Lynch, J., concurring) (writing
separately, in part, to "emphasize the need for congressional action to revise a badly outdated
statute").
43. See Hof van Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Antwerpen, 12e ch. Nov. 20, 2013,
2012/CO/1054 (Belg.) (describing history of the case), translated in 11 DIGITAL EVIDENCE
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE L. REV. 137 (2014), http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/5720/1/2138-3141-1-SM.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QG59-GAHW]; Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Dec. 1, 2015, Nr.
P.13.2082.N (Belg.) (rejecting appeal by Yahoo!), translated in 13 DIGITAL EVIDENCE
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
L.
REV.
156
(2016),
http://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/
viewFile/2310/2261 [https://perma.cc/A2ZM-KVZC]; Paul de Hert & Monika Kopcheva,
InternationalMutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Law Made Redundant: A Comment on the
Belgian Yahoo! Case, 27 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 291, 292 (2011).
44. Procureur-G6n6ral v. Yahoo! Inc., Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Jan. 18,
2011, Nr. P.10.1347.N (Belg.), translated in 8 DIGITAL EVIDENCE & ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE L.
REV.
216,
216-18
(2011),
http://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/1978/1915
[https://perma.cc/8FT2-DZKU].
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consumers," even if the company does not have a physical presence in
Belgium. 45
The Belgian Court also reasoned its way around the
extraterritorial enforcement concerns:
This measure does not require the presence abroad of Belgian police officers or
magistrates or any persons acting on their behalf. Neither does the measure require any
material action to be taken abroad. It is therefore a coercive measure with limited extent,
46
the execution of which does not require any intervention outside the Belgian territory.

In contrast to the approach taken by the Microsoft Ireland case, the
Belgian court held that territoriality is determined based on where the
data is accessed and received, not where it is located.
While far reaching, the Yahoo! case was arguably limited by its
facts; specifically, it involved a request for subscriber information
only.47 Subscriber information is generally deemed less revealing of

personal information than communications content. It is, as a general
matter, subject to fewer substantive and procedural protections.4 8 For
similar reasons, State A's unilateral demands for subscriber
information located in or held by a provider in State B are generally
deemed less of an intrusion of sovereign interests than State A's
equivalent demands for communications content.
But in a subsequent case against Skype, the Belgian courts
extended the decision to cover communications content as well. Belgian
prosecutors issued an order to disclose both noncontent and content
data regarding communications between two Belgian residents, as well
Skype
in obtaining these
from
assistance
as
technical
communications. 4 9 Although Skype provided basic registration
information, it asserted that it did not retain or have access to the
content of communications and other information that Belgian
authorities sought. Skype further argued that as a company

45. Id.
46. Id. ¶ 6 (emphasis added). The court also focused on the fact that the request was made in
pursuit of the investigation of an offense that fell within the scope of Belgian criminal jurisdiction
and was aimed at identification data only.
47. See Hert & Kopcheva, supra note 43, at 295.
48. This, however, is a premise that is increasingly coming under attack. See, e.g., Danielle
Citron & David Gray, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 140-41 (2013);
Dahlia Lithwick & Steve Vladeck, Taking the "Meh"Out of Metadata, SLATE (Nov. 22, 2013, 12:07
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2013/11/
PM),
nsa and metadata how the-government-can-spy-on-your-healthpolitical-beliefs.htm
[https://perma.cc/GMY8-XEFZ].
49. Procureur-G~ndral v. Skype, Correctionele Rechtbanken [Corr.] [Criminal Tribunal]
Antwerp, Division Mechelen, Oct. 27, 2016, No. ME20.4.1 105151-12, ¶¶ 1.2-1.5 (Belg.).
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headquartered in Luxembourg, any such request for communications
content should be directed to the Luxembourg government, not Skype. 0
Skype lost in both the lower court and on an initial appeal. 51 The
lower court concluded that, even though Skype was based in
Luxembourg, it had subjected itself to Belgian jurisdiction by "actively
participating in the economic life in Belgium" and offering services
there. 52 Relying on the Belgian Supreme Court's decision in Yahoo!, the
lower court judge defined the relevant enforcement action as territorial,
not extraterritorial. 53 The court emphasized that, as in the Yahoo! case,
no Belgian investigators would be entering another country, and the
sought-after information would be turned over in Belgium. The court
also dismissed concerns about a potential conflict with Luxembourg law
or infringement of Luxembourg's sovereignty: "A possible conflict with
Luxembourg law is not relevant here, given the fact that Skype had to
provide its technical cooperation on Belgian territory and not in
Luxembourg." 54 The appellate court fully agreed, adopting and
referring to the lower court's reasoning throughout its opinion.5 5
The Skype and Yahoo! cases raise additional considerations not
presented by the Microsoft Ireland case. In the Microsoft Ireland case,
U.S. law enforcement had clear jurisdiction over Microsoft; Microsoft is
based and headquartered in Redmond, Washington. In contrast,
neither Yahoo! nor Skype has any physical presence in Belgium. The
Belgian courts concluded nonetheless that jurisdiction existed over a
company that offered services in and "participated in the economic life"
in Belgium, even if it was not physically present. 56 A company that
advertises in and provides tailored technical assistance to the state's
residents, as Skype and Yahoo! did, is subject to Belgium's jurisdiction
under this approach. 57
50. Id. } 1.9. There was also a separate argument as to whether Skype constituted either an
"operator or a telecommunications network" or "provider of a telecommunication services" subject
to the disclosure obligations. Skype claimed it did not, but the court concluded it did. Id. 11 5.1.2,
5.2.
51. See Openbaar Ministerie v. Skype Communications SARL, Hof van Beroep [HvB] [Court
of Appeal] Antwerp, Nov. 15, 2017, 2016/CO/1006 (Belg.); see also Procureur-Ggndralv. Skype.
52. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that the company made its software
available for use on the Belgian territory, maintained a website and user manuals that could be
accessed in Dutch, and provided assistance and support in Dutch to users that encountered
software troubles. Procureur-Ggnralv. Skype, ¶ 5.3.4.
53. Id. ¶ 5.3.2-5.3.35.
54. Id. ¶ 5.5.3.
55. OpenbaarMinisterie v. Skype, ¶¶ 5.1.1.4., 5.1.2.2.
56. Id. ¶ 5.5.5.
57. Of course, if a provider lacks any presence of physical property in the territory, the
requesting government may not have any means of enforcing compliance, other than perhaps by
shutting down the service or otherwise blocking residents' access to its products. See Jack L.
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1216-21 (1998) (emphasizing the
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The Belgian courts also endorsed an entirely new and
potentially infinitely expansive ground for determining territorialitybased on where data is received, even if the relevant provider is not
physically located in the receiving state's territory. In the Microsoft
Irelandcase, the dispute was whether territoriality is determined based
on where the data is located (Ireland) or where the provider is located
and accesses the data (the United States). In the Yahoo! case, by
contrast, both the data and the provider were located extraterritorially.
The Belgian Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that the production
order was territorial because the sought-after data was received within
the requesting state's territorial boundaries. It is an approach that
essentially makes any production order territorial, regardless of other
considerations that might apply. The only relevant question becomes
whether there is a domestic, lawful basis to compel.
Such a reformulation of the definition of "territorial" serves
Belgian domestic law enforcement interests. Yet it has a number of
concerning implications. If applied broadly, such an approach would
mean that states could assert access to any data of interest, without
regard to countervailing interests of other states. If employed by states
with poor human rights records, it would yield a reduction of privacy
rights and the facilitation of other abuses based on how accessed data
is used. It also means that users would-absent the adoption of some
sort of globally applicable notice requirement-have no way to
determine which jurisdiction is accessing their data and under which
rules, with significant consequences for, among other things, the
possibility of either redress or democratic accountability. Such an
approach thus fails to respect the sometimes legitimate sovereign
interest in regulating access to data of a state's own nationals and
residents. And as a practical matter, it runs up against blocking
provisions enacted by a number of jurisdictions, including the United
States and most European countries-an issue I turn to now.
3. Blocking Provisions
Blocking provisions prohibit locally based providers from
disclosing data to foreign law enforcement officials, even if requested
pursuant to lawful process by the foreign jurisdiction. The same statute
that is at issue in the Microsoft Ireland case, for example, also prohibits
U.S.-based providers from directly disclosing U.S.-held stored

practical limits of enforcement jurisdiction). In both the Yahoo! and Skype cases, the companies
voluntarily submitted themselves to the relevant court's jurisdiction.
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communications content to foreign-based providers. 5 8 Any foreign law
enforcement entity that seeks access to such data must make a mutual
legal assistance request to the United States-and ultimately obtain a
U.S. warrant based on the U.S. standard of probable cause.59 This is so
regardless of the location of the target of the investigation or the
criminal activity that is being investigated. It is the source of an
increasing amount of frustration on behalf of foreign governments,
particularly when foreign governments are seeking data in the
investigation of local crime and the only U.S. nexus to the case is that
the sought-after data happens to be held by a U.S.-based provider
within U.S. territorial boundaries.6 0 Such blocking provisions also
create a direct conflict of laws if and when a foreign government-such
as Belgium-compels production of data that another country-such as
the U.S.-prohibits a provider from producing. This kind of conflict is
not just hypothetical. In January 2015, a Microsoft employee was
arrested in Brazil for failing to comply with Brazilian disclosure
requirements, even though U.S. law prohibited him from doing so. 6 1
Many European countries have similar, and even broader,
blocking provisions than those in place in the United States-covering
noncontent data as well as communications content. 62 The newly
enacted General Data Protection Regulation, for example, scheduled to

58. The Stored Communications Act ("SCA") prohibits providers from turning over the
content of communications, except in a limited number of situations. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 27022703(a) (2012). While a "governmental entity" may compel such production, pursuant to a lawfully
issued warrant, "governmental entity" is defined as "a department or agency of the United States
or any State or political subdivision thereof." 18 U.S.C. § 2711(4). Thus, foreign governments do
not qualify.
AND

59. See RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 227-28 (2013) (noting that it takes an average of ten months to
process these MLAT requests).
60. The scope of the prohibitions on disclosure is not spelled out in the statute. As a result,
the statute does not specify whether the prohibition governs all U.S.-based corporations, all U.S.held data, or both. See 18 U.S.C.A § 2703 (West 2009). Under the reasoning of the Second Circuit
Microsoft Ireland decision, the prohibition would apply to U.S.-held data only. In the wake of that
decision, the Department of Justice reportedly has been telling requesting governments that they
first must ascertain that the sought-after communications content is in the United States before
making a mutual legal assistance request for such data; previously, the Department of Justice
would accept such a request directed at data held by U.S.-based providers without regard to
location. Interview with Eur. Comm'n representative (Jan. 25, 2017) (notes on file with author).
61. See,
e.g., Brad
Smith, In the Cloud We Trust, MICROSOFT STORIES,
https://news.microsoft.com/stories/inthecloudwetrust/
(last
visited
Oct.
18,
2017)
[https://perma.cc/RGQ6-P8C6] (describing the 2015 arrest of a Microsoft employee by Brazilian
authorities for failing to turn over data that he was prohibited from disclosing under U.S. law).
62. See EUR. COMM'N, NON-PAPER: PROGRESS REPORT FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CYBERSPACE 6 (Dec. 2,

2016),
http://data.consilium.europa.euldoc/document/ST-15072-2016-INIT/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/9GME-9L5Z] [hereinafter EUR. COMM'N REPORT].
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go into effect in May 2018, prohibits the transfer of the personal data of
EU residents outside the EU unless pursuant to specific exemptions,
such as an explicit international agreement. 63 But there is currently no
explicit legal basis for providers to turn over EU subjects' data to foreign
law enforcement officials outside the EU, and as a result some have
claimed that they are presumptively barred from doing so. 64
Such blocking provisions are based on the presumption that the
sovereign interests in data are coterminous with its location-and thus
governments can and should set the rules governing foreign
government access to data held by locally based providers within their
territorial jurisdictions. But as we saw in the discussion of the Microsoft
Ireland case, this is a misguided assumption. The location of data is
fluid, changeable, and changing, and as a result is often mismatched
with the key security, privacy, economic, and other sovereign interests
at stake. Why, after all, should the United States or any other nation
demand that a foreign nation go through the diplomatic process to
access the data of a local target in a local crime investigation simply
because the data of interest happens to be stored within the United
States' territorial jurisdiction? Such a rule reflects a mismatch between
technology, law, and the underlying interests the law is meant to serve.
That said, for many privacy advocates, these blocking
provisions, at least as employed by the United States, are things to be
celebrated. After all, the United States' warrant requirement imposes
relatively robust substantive and procedural privacy protections, as
compared with those employed by many other nations around the
world. 65 Moreover, the Department of Justice reviews each foreign
government request for communications content as part of the mutual
63. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016,
art. 48, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
64. See, e.g., CEG REPORT, supra note 7, at 16 (noting the legal basis for the so-called
"asymmetric" sharing of personal identification information across borders-i.e., from
governments to service providers as part of a request for additional information and from service
providers to governments in response-is not so clearly established). There are, however,
agreements that explicitly permit the law-enforcement-to-law-enforcement sharing of data. See
Agreement Between the United States of America and the European Union on the Protection of
Personal Information Relating to the Prevention, Investigation, Detection, and Prosecution of
at 4, Aug. 9, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataCriminal Offenses,
E.U.-U.S.,
protection/files/dp-umbrella-agreement-en.pdf[https://perma.cc/9887-7M24]; Press Release, Eur.
Comm'n, Questions and Answers on the EU-U.S. Data Protection "Umbrella Agreement" (Dec. 1,
[https://perma.cc/JK3W2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-MEMO-16-4183_en.htm
ESXU] (discussing the intent to facilitate data transfer between the EU and United States "for the
purpose of preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting criminal offenses . .. in the
framework of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters").
65. See, e.g., Greg Nojeim & Ross Schulman, Foreign Governments, Tech Companies, and
Your Data: A Response to Jennifer Daskal & Andrew Woods, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 30, 2016, 4:05
https://www.justsecurity.org/32529/foreign-governments-tech-companies-data-responsePM),
jennifer-daskal-andrew-woods/ [https://perma.cc/GRV4-EG8A].
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legal assistance process, including an assessment as to the implications
for free speech-thus ensuring that data is not being sought to
prosecute individuals for engaging in what would be protected speech
under the First Amendment. The application of U.S. rules and
standards thus enhances both privacy and speech rights in specific
cases. EU countries similarly can rely on their own blocking provisions
to limit access by other repressive regimes.
But what this analysis neglects is the long-term effect of these
restrictions. Frustrated governments will, if sufficiently sophisticated,
find ways around the restrictions if the stakes are sufficiently high.
These work-arounds include costly data localization requirements,
pursuant to which providers are required to cache copies of data locally,
thus facilitating access by local governments; the use of alternative,
surreptitious means of accessing sought-after data; and increasing
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction that ignore the existence of
countervailing blocking provisions and put providers in the middle of a
conflict of laws problem, forcing them to choose which law to adhere to
and which to violate. 66
4. Nascent Reform Efforts: The EU, U.S., and Efforts at
Harmonization
Increased frustration caused by the inability to access data
needed for criminal investigations in a timely matter and uncertainty
over the rules that apply are yielding calls for reform within the EU,
the United States, and in coordinated efforts between the United States
and the U.K.
a. Council of Europe: Updates to the Budapest Convention
The Budapest Convention's Cloud Evidence Group, established
in 2014 by the state parties to the Budapest Convention, has long
focused on the difficulties in accessing data across borders and urged
updates to better account for law enforcement needs in accessing data

66. See, e.g., Peter Swire, Why Cross-Border Government Requests for Data Will Keep
Becoming
More
Important,
LAWFARE
BLOG
(May
23,
2017,
10:00
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-cross-border-government-requests-data-will-keep-becomingmore-important [https://perma.cc/XNP6-ZGFM] (making the point that if law enforcement is
unable to make workable requests for data, it will face increased pressure to either try to break
encryption or remotely hack into a device of interest); Andrew Keane Woods, Lessons from the
Mutual Legal Assistance Reform Effort, LAWFARE BLOG (May 22, 2017, 1:00 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.comllessons-mutual-legal-assistance-reform-effort
[https://perma.cc/9J94-TBKM] (arguing that the mutual legal assistance debate is tied to the
encryption debate).
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in the cloud. 6 7 In June 2017, the group announced the initiation of a
two-year-long effort to draft a new protocol to the Convention that
would, if adopted, facilitate law enforcement access to data in foreign,
multiple, and unknown jurisdictions. 6 8
Recent efforts also have led to a newly adopted guidance note to
accompany Article 18 of the Convention, albeit limited to subscriber
information only. 69 While not binding, the guidance note highlights an
evolution in thinking as well as continued stickiness of the linkage
between data location and sovereign interest in control.
Article 18 includes two parts. It requires state parties to
establish mechanisms by which law enforcement officials can order "a
person in its territory to submit specified computer data in that person's
possession or control."7 0 This provision applies to both content and
noncontent data. It also requires that state parties establish
mechanisms by which law enforcement officials can order a service
provider "offering its services in the territory of the Party" to turn over
subscriber information in that service provider's possession or control. 7
The provision itself is silent as to whether or not there are any
territorial limits on what can be produced.
The recently adopted guidance note seeks to clarify the
territorial reach of these two provisions as applied to compelled
disclosure orders directed at service providers-but for subscriber
information only. 7 2 First, it makes explicit that providers should be
required to produce all subscriber information within their possession
or control, regardless of the location of the data. In so doing, it explicitly
rejects a data location-driven approach to disclosure obligations, at
least with respect to subscriber information. 73

67. AD-HOC SUBGROUP ON TRANSBORDER ACCESS & JURISDICTION, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
TRANSBORDER ACCESS TO DATA AND JURISDICTION: OPTIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION BY THE T-CY 7

https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/
3,
2014),
(Dec.
[https://perma.cc/YH3K-ETPF]
DisplayDCTMContent?documentld=09000016802e726e
[hereinafter TRANSBORDER ACCESS TO DATA AND JURISDICTION].

68. See Cybercrime Convention Comm. Proposal, supra note 9; Cybercrime, supra note 9.
69. Cybercrime Convention Comm. Guidance, supra note 9, at 9 (noting that the guidance
note "represents the common understanding of the Parties as to the scope and elements of Article
18 Budapest Convention with respect to the production of subscriber information" (emphasis
added)).
70. Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,174, 10 E.T.S. No. 185,
http://www.europarl.europa.eulmeetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/7_conv-budapest_/7cony
budapest en.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH8T-BMJ6].
71. Id. art. 18(1)(b).
72. See Cybercrime Convention Comm. Guidance, supra note 9, at 3.
73. In the words of the guidance note, "Legal regimes increasingly recognize, both in the
criminal justice sphere and in the privacy and data protection sphere, that the location of the data
is not the determining factor for establishing jurisdiction." Id. at 7.
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Second, it clarifies the state's jurisdictional reach over
extraterritorially located providers, advocating a rule with broad
jurisdictional reach. Specifically, it covers any provider that enables
persons in the territory to use its service and orients its activities
toward those persons (e.g., providers that engage in advertising in the
relevant jurisdiction, even if they lack a physical presence there). 74 This
is akin to the broad jurisdictional hook adopted by the Belgian courts in
the Yahoo! and Skype cases, although limited to situations in which the
government is seeking subscriber information only.
Such a broad jurisdictional hook seems, at first blush, to reject
the view that states' access to sought-after data depends either on
where it happens to be held or where the provider happens to be located.
Rather, what matters is that the provider offers services in the
jurisdiction and that there is a lawful domestic basis to access the data
by the requesting state-that the information is relevant to a legitimate
domestic investigation and that the relevant procedural and
substantive criteria in the requesting state have been met.7 5
But on further evaluation, the note is much less far reaching
than it initially appears. At the same time that the note endorses the
authority of state parties to compel the production of subscriber
information from extraterritorially located service providers, it also
supports the continued right of states to block such requests. In the
note's words, "[a]greement to this Guidance Note does not entail
consent to the extraterritorial service or enforcement of a domestic
production order issued by another State."7 6 In other words, the
guidance note endorses states' authority to reach service providers
beyond their borders, yet refuses to disclaim government efforts to block
such foreign government reach.
Moreover, the unwillingness and inability of the parties to the
EU Cybercrime Committee to endorse-even in this tepid way-the

74.

See COUNCIL OF EuR., EXPLANATORY REPORT TO THE CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME 29

(2001), https://rm.coe.int/16800cce5b [https://perma.cc/K8FC-37VT].
75. Depending on how interpreted and applied, this approach could require several U.S.based providers to change their current practices. U.S.-based providers can, as a matter of law,
provide any subscriber information to requesting foreign law enforcement (the blocking provisions
only apply to content). But several providers have in place internal rules that preclude them from
providing subscriber information about customers located outside the jurisdiction of the requesting
state. See CEG REPORT, supra note 7, at 27 (noting concern about "self-made rules barring
disclosures when an IP address resolves to a country other than the requesting country"). This
guidance note, however, includes no such limitation based on location of the target.
76. Cybercrime Convention Comm. Guidance, supra note 9, at 6. The guidance note also
states that "[t]he service and enforceability of domestic production orders against providers
established outside the territory of a Party raises further issues which cannot be fully addressed
in a Guidance Note. Some Parties may require that subscriber information be requested through
mutual legal assistance." Id. at 1.
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authority of foreign governments to compel the production of
communications content located or held by a subscriber outside their
borders is notable, especially given that the category of "person" in the
first part of Article 18 covers service providers and is not, on its face,
limited to subscriber information. This reflects at least three
considerations: first, that communications content is often deemed
more sensitive, and thus deserving of stronger protections than
subscriber information;7 7 second, that states have, as a result, a greater
interest in limiting access to such data; and third, the stickiness of the
linkage between sovereignty and territory, irrespective of other
normative and practical considerations. I return to these issues in
Section II.B.
b. The EU Reform Effort
Parallel to the Council of Europe's efforts, the EU is working to
develop its own response to the jurisdictional challenges. This is made
difficult by the wide diversity of approaches to the jurisdictional
questions even amongst EU member states. For some EU members,
jurisdiction turns on the "main seat of the service provider"; for some
"the place where services are offered"; and for others "the place where
data is stored"; a recent European Commission report also noted "a
combination of [unspecified]

alternatives"

as well.78

As a recent

European Commission report put it, "[t]he use of different approaches
creates legal uncertainty for authorities issuing requests, as well as for
service providers to which the requests are directed."7 9 The report
further warns that "the legal uncertainty may also interfere with rights
of the persons to which the requested evidence relates, including their
right to privacy.80
In response, the European Commission has launched an
initiative designed to "address obstacles in cross-border access to
electronic evidence in criminal investigations."8 1 The project aims at
facilitating cross-border access to data amongst EU members. It also
seeks to address the need for access to data outside the EU, in
particular data held by the United States. 82

77.

See supra note 48.

78.

See EUR. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 62, at 5.

79. Id. at 13.
80. Id.
81. Improving Cross-Border Access to Evidence in Electronic Matters, EUR. COMMISSION 3
(Mar. 8, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulationlinitiatives/ares-2017-3896097_en
[https://perma.cc/S788-D6S6] [hereinafter Inception Impact Assessment].
82. Id. at 2.
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Meanwhile, the European Investigative Order ("EIO") offers a
way to facilitate improved government-to-government cooperation via
a system of mutual recognition. An EIO is a judicial decision issuing or
approving a request for evidence from one state (the "requesting" state)
to another (the "executing" state). 83 With a few specified exceptions, the
executing state is required to give effect to an EIO as if they had been
issued by the state's own domestic authority-thus streamlining the
process of government review and expediting response times. 84
But while streamlined, the executing country still has up to
thirty days to determine whether to recognize the EIO and another
ninety days to carry out the requested investigative measure. In a fastmoving investigation, this is a very long time. Moreover, the Directive
establishing the EIO presumes that participating states will know
where to direct the request. It thus provides a mechanism for improved
state-to-state cooperation when there is consensus about who has
territorial control, but it does not resolve the first order questions as to
the basic source of territorial control. Is it the location of the data? The
provider? The target? The crime? Or some combination thereof? Until
there is some additional clarity as to those questions, participating
states are likely to continue to clash over the basic question of whether
an EIO is even needed, or whether they can simply assert territorial
control-as envisioned by the newly adopted guidance note to Article 18
of the Budapest Convention, albeit with respect to subscriber
information only, and exemplified by the Belgian approach in the
Yahoo! and Skype cases.
c. U.S. Legislative Proposalsand the U.S.-U.K. Agreement
Because of the dominance of U.S.-based service providers,
foreign governments regularly find themselves seeking data subject to
U.S. jurisdiction. This also means that U.S. blocking provisions that
prohibit U.S.-based companies from directly disclosing communications
to foreign law enforcement is a particular source of frustration for
foreign governments. In response, the United States and United
Kingdom have negotiated a draft agreement that would lift some of
these restrictions and permit U.K. law enforcement to directly access

83. Directive 2014/41/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014
Regarding the European Investigation Order in Criminal Matters, 2014 O.J. (L 130) 1, 6-7
[hereinafter Investigation Directive] (discussion of Article 1).
84. Id. at 2.
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communications content held by U.S.-based providers in certain
specified circumstances. 85
While the actual text of the draft agreement has not yet been
released, the basic contours have been spelled out in a variety of public
statements-and in the outlines of draft legislation needed to
implement such an agreement. 86 It would permit the U.K. to directly
compel the production of communications content of non-U.S. citizens
located outside the United States, but only if specified criteria are met.
Among other requirements, the requests would have to be
particularized, subject to judicial review, and subject to minimization
requirements to protect against the retention and dissemination of
nonrelevant information.87 If the U.K. law enforcement officials sought
the communications content of a U.S. resident or citizen (wherever
located), it would still need to employ the mutual legal assistance
process and ultimately obtain, via a U.S. prosecutor, a U.S.-issued
warrant based on probable cause.
As already indicated, however, the draft agreement cannot be
implemented unless and until the U.S. Congress passes legislation to
amend the statutory bar.88 Draft legislation submitted by the
Department of Justice to Congress in 2016, and again in 2017, would
do just that.8 9 It would explicitly permit the United States to enter into
the kind of executive agreements contemplated with the United
85. See, e.g., International Conflicts of Law Concerning Cross Border Data Flow and Law
Enforcement Requests: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 9-15 (2016)
[hereinafter International Conflicts Hearing] (statement of David Bitkower, Principal Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice); Nakashima & Peterson, supra
note 10.
86. See Letter from Samuel R. Ramer, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the
U.S.
House
of Representatives
(May
24,
2017),
https://judiciary.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/Downing-Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7JM-4ARP]
[hereinafter
Letter to Ryan]; International Conflicts Hearing, supra note 85 (statement of David Bitkower
conveying a framework in which the United States may disclose data directly to the United
Kingdom and receive reciprocal access to data stored in the United Kingdom); Letter from Peter
J. Kadzik, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Joseph R. Biden, President of the U.S. Senate (July 15,
2015), http://www.netcaucus.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-7-15-US-UK-Legislative-Proposal-toHill.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX34-6UWS] [hereinafter Letter to Biden] (conveying proposed
legislation and a section-by-section analysis).
87. Letter to Ryan, supra note 86 (setting out these requirements as a matter of statute);
Letter to Biden, supra note 86.
88. See Letter to Ryan, supra note 86; Letter to Biden, supra note 86.
89. InternationalConflicts Hearing, supra note 85 (statement of Jennifer Daskal, Assistant
Professor, American University Washington College of Law); Letter to Ryan, supranote 86; Letter
to Biden, supra note 86; see also Jennifer Daskal & Andrew K. Woods, Congress Should Embrace
the
DOJ's
Cross-Border Fix,
JUST
SECURITY
(Aug.
1,
2016,
8:03
AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/32213/congress-embrace-dojs-cross-border-data-fix/
[https://perma.cc/GUP7-WU8C]; David Kris, U.S. Government Presents DraftLegislation for CrossBorder Data Requests, LAWFARE (July 16, 2016, 8:07 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/usgovernment-presents-draft-legislation-cross-border-data-requests [https://perma.cc/P4FL-TE2B].
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Kingdom so long as certain conditions are met. First, the Attorney
General and Secretary of State would need to certify that the partner
nation demonstrates basic respect for the rule of law. Second, it
specifies a number of requirements that each foreign government
request for data must meet-including, among other things, that the
requests be targeted, particularized, time-limited, and reviewed or
overseen by a court or other independent entity. Third, it prohibits
foreign governments from directly accessing the data of U.S. citizens
and other persons living in the United States; the foreign government
would still need to employ the mutual legal assistance process for those
requests. And fourth, it requires that the partner state take steps to
protect against the retention and dissemination of information about
U.S. citizens and residents, and comply with various auditing
requirements, transparency, and other accountability mechanisms.
The approach is interesting for two key reasons. First, it reflects
a shift in focus from location of data or provider to location and
nationality of the target as determinative of the rules that apply.
Foreign partners can access non-U.S. citizen and resident data
according to their own rules, but they need to abide by U.S.
requirements when seeking the data of U.S. citizens and residents. This
reflects the normative view that states have a legitimate interest in
controlling access to their own citizens' and residents' data, but have
much less of a justification in controlling access to the data of other
extraterritorially located targets simply because of the fact that the
sought-after data happens to be held locally.
Second, it makes clear that such requests are only legitimate if
certain baseline standards are met. It thus uses the United States'
leverage as the home to so much of the world's data to impose a set of
baseline procedural and substantive standards that apply to law
enforcement requests for data outside the United States. It lays out a
minimum standard framework, saying only those requests that satisfy
the basic due process requirements specified by the United States are
eligible for this kind of expedited access. If successful, it could serve as
a means of setting baseline standards in ways that enhance due process
and privacy rights across borders. In fact, it seems that even the
possibility of such a scheme has, in at least one instance, led to a modest
raising of standards: recent amendments to U.K. surveillance laws
require-for the first time ever-judicial review of compelled
production orders for stored communication content. Informal
discussions suggest that the U.K. Home Office was persuaded to
support the judicial review provisions because, among other reasons,
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they recognized they were needed in order for the United States to
approve its draft agreement. 90
B. Direct Government Access
The discussion so far has focused on compelled disclosure
orders-pursuant to which the government seeks data held by thirdparty providers. A separate but related set of issues are raised by
governmental efforts to directly access data or devices when the soughtafter data or device is located across territorial borders. These issues
were hotly debated in the leadup to recent amendments to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41 in the United States, and have been the topic
of conversation in the European Union and Council of Europe as well.
1. Rule 41 Amendments
On December 1, 2016, the newly amended Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41 went into effect. 91 For the first time, the U.S.
criminal rules of procedure explicitly authorize remote search warrants
and lift the jurisdictional limits that would otherwise apply.
Specifically, the rules allow for a judge to issue a remote search
warrant-what some have labeled a "lawful hacking" warrant-if the
location of the target data or device is unknown and the location has
been concealed due to technological means, such as the use of
anonymization software like Tor. 92
As several commentators have noted, the updated rule will
almost inevitably result in judges inadvertently authorizing searches of

90.

Interview with U.K. gov't officials, at U.K. Home Office (Nov. 12, 2016) (notes on file with

author).

91. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
92. Id. At least one magistrate judge had under the prior version of the rule rejected such a
warrant in these circumstances. The magistrate concluded that if the device were of an unknown
location, it could potentially be outside his district-and thus outside his jurisdiction. See In re
Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756-61 (S.D.
Tex. 2013). A handful of other courts have suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to remote search
warrants for similar reasons. See, e.g., United States v. Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080 (S.D. Iowa
2016); see also Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Criminal Rules 2 (Sept. 18, 2013),
http://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Raman-letter-to-committee-.pdf
[https://perma.ce/6Y6N-8JFXv] [hereinafter Letter from Raman to Raggi] (emphasizing that the
circumstances "where investigators can identify the target computer, but not the district in which
it is located . .. [are] occurring with greater frequency in recent years"); Leslie R. Caldwell, Rule
41 Changes Ensure a Judge May Consider Warrantsfor CertainRemote Searches, U.S. DEP'T JUST.
(June 20, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opalblog/rule-41-changes-ensure-judge-may-considerwarrants-certain-remote-searches [https://perma.cc/ML7Y-Z55Y] (explaining need for rule
change).
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extraterritorially located data or devices; 93 after all, if the location of
the data or device is unknown, it may very well be located across
borders. 94 The U.S. government has acknowledged this possibility and
stated that if the data or device ends up being extraterritorially located,
the warrant will have no force (although the existence of the warrant
will speak to the reasonableness of the search). 95 There is, after all, no
Rule 41 authority to issue warrants for extraterritorially located
property.
Some have suggested that such inadvertent accessing of data
across borders will constitute a violation of foreign governments'
sovereignty and thus international law. In the words of Professor
Ahmed Ghappour, writing in the Stanford Law Review, "[t]he use of
cross-border network investigative techniques undercuts the DOJ's
democratic legitimacy to the extent it requires an interpretation of
statutory investigative authority to extend overseas, . . . in violation of
customary internationallaw."96
Ghappour contrasts these remote hacking warrants with the
kind of compelled disclosure orders at issue in the Microsoft Ireland
case. In his view, a compelled disclosure order for data located
extraterritorially does not violate international law, whereas remote
searches conducted by law enforcement might. As he puts it: "Indirect
collection of foreign-located evidence, by contrast, does not require the
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction overseas. Instead, compelled
disclosure orders impose an affirmative duty on third parties to disclose
evidence in their possession or control . . . ."91
93. See, e.g., Ghappour, supra note 13, at 1081 (calling the Rule 41 change the largest
expansion of extraterritorial law enforcement jurisdiction in FBI history").
94. The government is responding in part to the growing use of anonymization tools, the most
predominant of which is Tor. But the vast majority of Tor users are foreign based, meaning that,
in at least some situations, remote searches of Tor-users' devices will yield the search of a device
located in a foreign territory. See Top-10 Countries by Relay Users, TOR METRICS,
Oct.
20,
2017)
(last
visited
http://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-table.html
[https://perma.cc/C7AP-5K8T] (estimating that about nineteen percent of Tor's daily users are
based in the United States).
95. Letter from Raman to Raggi, supranote 92, at 5.
96. Ghappour, supra note 13, at 1126 (objecting, in part, to the process by which the rule
change came about). Others have similarly claimed, albeit in different contexts, that remote
intrusions that involve "the transmission of electrical impulses in a manner that change[s] (and
d[oes] not simply observe) the physical status quo in a foreign computer system" violate the
prohibition on extraterritorial law enforcement jurisdiction. See Craig Forcese, The "Hacked"US
Election: Is InternationalLaw Silent, Faced with the Clatterof Cyrillic Keyboards?, JUST SECURITY
(Dec. 16, 2016, 1:52 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/35652/hacked-election-international-lawsilent-faced-clatter-cyrillic-keyboards/ [https://perma.cc/649W-HRWR]. The copying of data
involved in a Rule 41-authorized search would involve such "transmission of electronic impulses,"
even if it did not change the user's ability to access or manipulate the data. It would thus, under
this test, constitute an impermissible exercise of law enforcement authority.
97. Ghappour, supra note 13, at 1103.
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But more is needed to explain why this distinction between
direct and indirect access is as salient as Ghappour has suggested, so
long as the data is merely copied and not otherwise altered in both
cases. There are, of course, important reasons to be concerned about the
scope of lawful hacking orders. There is, for example, a reasonable
likelihood that lawful hacking will yield access to a much broader
amount of data than the targeted bit of information turned over
pursuant to compelled disclosure orders. And lawful hacking, if not
appropriately targeted, can sweep in the data of innocent users and/or
lead to the triggering of other invasive surveillance techniques. 98 But
assuming for the sake of argument that the data obtained is equivalent,
it is hard to understand why the key sovereignty, security, and privacy
interests would vary based on whether it is law enforcement agents or
third-party providers accessing the data. In both cases, law enforcement
agents in State A never set foot in State B's territory; the law
enforcement agent and private party caretaker are similarly situated,
at least in that respect.
To be clear, I am not saying that law enforcement should be
given free rein to access data held in another state's jurisdiction. But
what I am saying is this: to the extent such direct access raises concerns
(which I accept it often does), the concerns seem to me due to something
other than the fact that it is remote access by law enforcement, as
opposed to remote access by a third party. Rather, the concerns are
about what is accessed (and there is a real risk law enforcement access
will not be sufficiently targeted), and the tools used to access it (given
among other things the risk of network investigative techniques going
awry), and not primarily about who is accessing the data.
It is also hard to understand why the inadvertent accessing of
data in other jurisdictions, even by law enforcement, is necessarily a
violation of sovereignty. To the contrary, informal conversations
suggest that most governments, including the United States, appreciate
if and when a foreign government inadvertently uncovers evidence
about a local device or individual and discloses that information to the
host country in a way that can then be used to make an arrest or
otherwise shut down malicious activity.9 9 It thus seems that any

98. Remote searches that involve the use of invasive network investigative techniques that,
for example, threaten to spread malware throughout the system or involve the use of remote
activation of a device's microphone or camera raise separate concerns; such intrusions are
obviously more invasive. But even in these circumstances, it is not obvious that the inadvertent
accessing of data or a device in a foreign government's jurisdiction would necessarily constitute a
sovereignty violation (as opposed to other kinds of violations) if coupled with notice to the foreign
government once the location of the device was discovered.
99. Interview with Dep't of Justice officials (Nov. 15, 2016) (notes on file with author).
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sovereignty violation occurs, if at all, when a government continues to
unilaterally search or seize extraterritorially located devices or data
after they learn where the device or data is located, particularly in cases
where what is accessed is not sufficiently targeted.
2. The EU and Council of Europe Approach
The EU and the Council of Europe also are similarly struggling
to determine when, and in what circumstances, law enforcement agents
can themselves seize data across borders. The Budapest Convention's
Cloud Evidence Group has warned in particular about the failure to
address the "loss of location" problem-warning that it is leading
governments to "increasingly pursue unilateral solutions" with "unclear
safeguards."10 0 The Group has launched a discussion about a new
protocol to the Convention in response that would, among other
changes, permit "[t]ransborder access without consent in good faith or
in exigent or other circumstances," with notification requirements built
in. 101 A recent European Commission report has similarly emphasized
the possibility of direct law enforcement
access in certain
circumstances. 102
Notably, there is an already existing model. for this approach
within the EU. The Directive on the European Investigative Order
allows an "intercepting state" to access the telecommunications of a
target located within another state, so long as it provides notice to the
state where the target is located.10 3 This notice is to be provided in
advance when possible; if the target's location is not known in advance,
notice needs to be provided as soon as the location is known. The
notified party then has ninety-six hours to object. If there is no

100. CEG REPORT, supra note 7, at 16-17, 45. Article 32 of the Budapest Convention explicitly
authorizes a state party to directly and unilaterally access data in another jurisdiction in only two
circumstances: (i) if the data is publicly available (open source); or (ii) with respect to "stored
computer data located in another Party," the "person who has the lawful authority to disclose"
provides his or her "lawful and voluntary consent." Convention on Cybercrime, supranote 70. This
second provision presupposes knowledge as to where the data is stored: "Article 32b refers to
'stored computer data located in another Party.' . . . [It] would not cover situations where the data
are not stored in another Party or where it is uncertain where the data are located." See
TRANSBORDER ACCESS TO DATA AND JURISDICTION, supra note 67, at 19; see also Cybercrime
Convention Comm. (T-CY), Criminal Justice Access to Data in the Cloud: Challenges, COUNCIL
EUR. (May 26, 2015), https://rm.coe.int/1680304b59 [https://perma.cc/C8VT-VYUS] (discussion
paper prepared by T-CY Cloud Evidence Group); Cybercrime Convention Comm. (T-CY), T-CY
Guidance Note # 3 Transborder Access to Data (Article 32), COUNCIL EUR. 6 (Nov. 5, 2013),
https://rm.coe.int/16802e726a [https://perma.cc/H8T5-MQXN].
101. Cybercrime, supra note 9; CEG REPORT, supra note 7, at 45.
102. See Inception Impact Assessment, supra note 81; EUR. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 62,
at 12-14.
103. See Investigation Directive, supra note 83, art. 31.
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objection, then the interception can continue. But if the host state
objects, the sought-after collection cannot go forward or must be
terminated if it has already begun. 104
This kind of compromise measure makes sense. It recognizes
both the sovereign interest in accessing sought-after data in certain
circumstances, regardless of the location, and the sovereign interest in
controlling-and perhaps limiting-law enforcement activity within a
state's territory in certain circumstances. And it seeks to accommodate
both by placing reciprocal obligations of notice and an opportunity to
object on participating states. It thus moves away from the fraught
assumption that location of data necessarily controls for purposes of
delimiting a state's jurisdictional reach, but also recognizes that
sovereigns may have a legitimate and countervailing interest in
limiting access to data that is territorially located.
II. THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AND OTHER BROAD-REACHING
PRIVACY REGULATIONS

The right to be forgotten and the related disputes about
implementation raise a very different, but related, set of jurisdictional
concerns. Whereas attempts by law enforcement to access data across
borders primarily raise questions about the permissible scope of
enforcement jurisdiction, the right to be forgotten and other related
privacy-based regulations primarily raise questions about the reach of
prescriptive jurisdiction. Yet, there is overlap with respect to some of
the key foundational questions, such as whether and in what situations
extraterritorially located providers should be subject to a state's
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. The right to be forgotten and
other privacy regulations also-as with law enforcement requests for
data-place front and center the increasingly important role of
transnational corporations in mediating disputes across borders. As
with law enforcement access issues, companies that hold the data are
often the ones in the position of deciding which set of rules to comply
with and which to resist.
I start with the right to be forgotten, and then briefly address
other EU-wide privacy regulations, as reflected in the soon-to-be
implemented General Data Protection Regulation.

104. Id.
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A. The Right to Be Forgotten
In 2014, the European Court of Justice issued a landmark ruling
in what is known as the Google Spain Case, asserting a far-reaching
"right to be forgotten." The case was initiated in 2010, when Mr. Costeja
Gonzalez, a Spanish national, demanded that Google remove from its
search engine results links to two then-sixteen-year-old newspaper
articles that announced the auctioning off of his repossessed home.
These articles appeared when one typed in Mr. Gonzalez's name into
Google's search engine.1 0 5 Notably, Mr. Gonzalez never contested the
truthfulness of the article. He instead asserted that the underlying
debts had been resolved, that the information was therefore no longer
relevant, and that he had a right to control the disclosure of such
personal information, including the right to demand that it be delinked
from a search of his name. Google refused to delink the articles, and the
case ultimately made its way to the European Court of Justice ("ECJ").
The ECJ sided with Mr. Gonzalez. Relying on a penumbral
interpretation of the Data Protection Directive then in place, it ruled
that Google, as a search engine, was required to delist information that
is "inadequate, irrelevant or excessive in relation to the purposes of the
processing, ... not kept up to date, or ...
kept for longer than is
necessary unless . . . required to be kept for historical, statistical or

scientific purposes"
ven if the information is accurate.10 6 It further
concluded that the right applied regardless of whether or not the data
subject could show any prejudice.10 Moreover, this obligation applied
even if the original provider of the information (in this case the
newspaper) was permitted to make the information available on its own
website. According to the ECJ, there was something unique-and
potentially privacy destructive-about the "ubiquitous" information
available on a search engine. In contrast to an isolated article on a
single website, a search engine could reveal a "vast number of aspects
of [o]ne's private life" that "without the search engine, could not have
been interconnected or could have been only with great difficulty."10 8

105. Google Spain Case, supra note 11, J¶ 14-16. Mr. Gonzalez also filed an action against the
newspaper, seeking that the paper remove or alter the original stories. The action against the
newspaper was dismissed. Id.
106. Id. ¶¶ 4, 94. For a forceful critique of the ECJ's analysis, see Robert Post, Data Privacy
and DignitaryPrivacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Constructionof the Public
Sphere, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2953468
[https://perma.ce/EU2Z-H44D].
107. See Google Spain Case, supra note 11, NJ 4, 94.
108. Id. 1 80; see also Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation
of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on "Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia
Espailola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzdlez" C-131/12, at 6 (Nov. 26,
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The ECJ acknowledged that the right had to be balanced against
the potentially countervailing interest of other internet users in
information being made publicly available. Yet, it concluded that "as a
general rule" the "data subject's rights override" those interests of other
internet users.1 09 If, however, the data subject is a "public figure," the
countervailing interest of internet users in being able to access
information is greater. For public figures, the right can be overridden if
"justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in
having ... access to the information in question." 110 The court did not
define who constituted a "public figure" or how one might determine
whether the general public had a "preponderant interest" in the
information.
On the jurisdictional questions, the ECJ also rejected Google's
claim that it fell outside the Data Protection Directive because it was
merely compiling information already in the public domain and
therefore neither a "processor" or "controller" of data-the two
categories that subjected Google to the relevant obligations. The ECJ
emphasized that search engines create unique and potentially
significant privacy concerns (and ones that the EU sought to regulate)
and concluded that Google qualified as a "controller" of data."n
There are at least three notable aspects of this ruling in relation
to the topic of this Article. First, the ECJ concluded the EU has broad
prescriptive jurisdictional reach over search engines operating in the
EU pursuant to the Data Protection Regulation, irrespective of where
2014),
http://ec.europa.euljustice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf [https://perma.cclUN6A-QC9U] [hereinafter Article 29
Working Party Guidelines] ("Even when (continued) publication by the original publishers is
lawful, the universal diffusion and accessibility of that information by a search engine, together
with other data related to the same individual, can be unlawful due to the disproportionate impact
on privacy.").
109. Google Spain Case, supra note 11, ¶ 82.
110. Id. 1 99.
111. Specifically, the ECJ ruled that the collecting, retrieving, recording, organizing, indexing,
storing, and disclosing of information that is done in order to operate a search engine constitutes
the "processing" of such data, so as to bring Google within the regulation of the EU. It further
concluded that as an operator of a search engine, Google is a "controller" of data, thus subjecting
Google to the additional obligations imposed on data controllers. Id. ¶¶ 32, 41:
The activity of a search engine consisting in finding information published or placed on
the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and,
finally, making it available to internet users according to a particular order of
preference must be classified as 'processing of personal data' . . . when that information
contains personal data and . . . the operator of the search engine must be regarded as
the 'controller' in respect of that processing, within the meaning of [the relevant Data
Protection Directive].
It is now fairly well established that search engines such as Google constitute "processors" and
"controllers" subject to EU data protection regulations, as well as the newly adopted General Data
Privacy Regulation ("GDPR") that will go into effect in 2018. See supra note 63.
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the search engine is headquartered or where the relevant processing
and indexing of information takes place. Google argued that because
the processing of the data was done by Google, Inc., which was based in
the United States and not the EU, it was not subject to the EU
regulations. The ECJ disagreed. In the ECJ's words, if the operator of
a search engine sets up a branch or subsidiary in an EU state and that
branch or subsidiary is "intended to promote and sell advertising space
offered

by that engine and . ..

orients its activity

towards the

inhabitants of that Member State," it is subject to the EU's prescriptive
jurisdiction. 112 Here, Google Spain, a subsidiary of Google, operated in
Spain, engaged in advertising activity targeted at Spanish residents,
and did so with the aim of making the Google search engine, and thus
Google, Inc., profitable. It thus brought both Google Spain and Google,
Inc. within the EU's jurisdiction.
Notably, the newly adopted General Data Privacy Regulation
("GDPR"), goes even a step further--expanding its jurisdictional reach
to companies that serve EU residents and providers that process EU
data, even if they do not have a physical presence in the EU. 113 More
specifically, the regulation imposes its wide array of obligationsincluding the specifically mentioned right to be forgotten--on any
search engine (as well as other "processors" and "controllers" of data)
that is "offering . .. goods or services" to EU subjects, or "monitoring
[the] behavior" of EU-based subjects. 114 Thus, whereas the ECJ
grounded its prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction in part on the
fact that Google Spain was located within a member state, the GDPR
eliminates that location-based requirement. This is akin to the
jurisdictional test adopted by the Belgian courts in the Yahoo! and
Skype cases, and the approach of the EU in the proposed guidance note
on Article 18 of the Budapest Convention, albeit limited to subscriber
information. It suggests, at least within the EU, a move toward a widereaching approach to prescriptive jurisdiction that imposes EU
obligations on companies that offer services in the EU, even if not
physically present there. And it yields the possibility of territorial
regulation with far-reaching extraterritorial effect.
Second, the ECJ placed the delisting obligation on Google, as the
data controller in the case. (Because Google is the search engine of
choice for about ninety percent of EU residents, I focus on Google's

112. Google Spain Case, supra note 11, 1 6.
113. GDPR, supra note 63, art. 3(2).
114. Id.; see also Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: Europe's Intermediary Liability Laws and
the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 2017 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2914684 [https://perma.cclLB39-PKKW].
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response here. 115) This of course is not the only way to design an
implementation system. The court could have, for example, insisted
that the data subject had a right to an administrative review of a
claimed right to be forgotten. By instead placing the obligation squarely
on the search engine, the court gave Google, a private actor, an
enormous amount of discretion to make the initial decisions about who
constitutes a public figure, what constitutes the countervailing right to
know, and how to mediate between these conflicting interests. Between
May 2014 (when Google first implemented a process of reviewing such
requests) and December 2016, Google received over 665,000 requests
for removal, evaluated over 1.8 million URLs, and removed
approximately forty-three percent of the 1.8 million URLs. 116
In evaluating these requests, a team of lawyers and paralegals
make a number of discretionary decisions about relevance of the data,
the length of time it should be made available, the individual's role in
society (i.e., whether they are a "public figure"), and the extent of the
public's countervailing right to know. Google says that it makes these
decisions "in alignment" with the guidelines developed by the Article 29
Working Party-guidelines which include a complicated set of thirteen
separate factors to be considered, several of which are broken up into
multiple additional questions to be evaluated. 117 And while there is the
possibility of appeal to a Data Protection Agency, there is no mechanism
for a member of the public to know about, let alone complain, if Google
adheres to the request to delist but does so in an arguably excessive
manner. In such cases, there is no record of the decisions or review
mechanism by which Google's decisions can be challenged.
Moreover, in any close case, the incentives all seem tipped in
favor of delisting. Under the newly enacted GDPR, failure to respect the
data subject's "right" to delisting (or what the GDPR calls "erasure")
115. The rest of the market is split primarily between Bing (owned by Microsoft), Yahoo!, and
Baidu (a Chinese-based search engine). See Desktop Search Engine Market Share,
https://www.netmarketshare.com/search-engine-market(Aug.
2017),
NETMARKETSHARE
share.aspx?qprid=4&qpcustomd=0 [https://perma.cc9R65-XEGR].
116. These statistics are updated daily. European Privacy Requests Search Removals FAQs,
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/faq/
GOOGLE,
?hl=en#are-you removing (last visited Oct. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cclYL3Q-UUQX] [hereinafter
European Privacy FAQ]; see also Search Removals Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/
(last visited Oct. 20,
2017)[https://perma.ccQQ97-KAAU]. Other search engines operating in Europe are subject to
similar obligations. But as the search engine for over ninety percent of EU users, the
implementation burden has fallen primarily on Google. I thus focus on Google's processes here.
117. EuropeanPrivacy FAQ, supra note 116; see Article 29 Working Party Guidelines, supra
note 108, at 12-20. The Working Group was set up by 95/46/EC, art. 29. Council Directive
95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995, 1995 O.J. (L 281). It
is comprised of representatives from each member state, European Commission representatives,
and EC institution representatives, and it operates by majority vote.
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can lead to fines of up to four percent of the controller's global
revenue.1 1 8 Thus, whereas failure to delink can yield a hefty fine,
excessive delinking results in no penalty. The initial decisionmaking
also is made without a countervailing entity to represent either the
public's right to know or the original source of the information. 119
Specific journalists can, and in fact have, learned of and protested these
decisions (thus further highlighting the very data that the subject
sought to make obscure), but these protests are both rare and occur
after the fact, once the decision has already been made. 120
Third, the ECJ left open the key, and still contested, issue as to
the territorial scope of the announced right. How far does the obligation
to delink extend? Initially, Google responded by delinking the
information from the European Google Search domains (i.e., google.fr,
google.de, google.es, etc.) and left it accessible elsewhere, including on
google.com. The Article 29 Working Group made clear that it viewed
this as insufficient:
[L]imiting de-listing to EU
engines via their national
satisfactorily guarantee the
this means that in any case
including .com. 121

domains on the grounds that users tend to access search
domains cannot be considered a sufficient mean[s] to
rights of data subjects according to the ruling. In practice,
de-listing should also be effective on all relevant domains,

In May 2015, the French data protection agency ("CNIL") took
up the mantle of the Article 29 Working Party and ordered Google to
remove delinked information from all applicable domains, including the
.com domain. 122
Google appealed, warning of the "innumerable examples around
the world where content that is declared illegal under the laws of one
country, would be deemed legal in others." As Google's General Counsel,
Kent Walker, put it, "if French law applies globally, how long will it be
until other countries-perhaps less open and democratic-start

.

118. GDPR, supra note 63, art. 83(5).
119. In fact, the Article 29 Working Group, which oversees implementation of the EU's Data
Privacy Directive, objects to Google, or any other search engine, notifying the initial source of the
information given, among other concerns, the risk that notification will result in the information
being further spotlighted. See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines, supra note 108, at 3 ("Search
engines should not as a general practice inform the webmasters of the pages affected . ... "); Id. at
10 (warning that "[sluch a communication is in many cases a processing of personal data and, as
such, requires a proper legal ground in order to be legitimate. No legal ground can be found . .
EuropeanPrivacy FAQ, supra note 116.
120. See, e.g., Jeffery Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion
[perma.cc/QW75-FNYB]
(describing controversy over perceived attempts to delete links to a BBC blog post).
121. See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines, supranote 108, at 3.
122. The CNIL is comprised of seventeen members, including parliamentarians; members of
the French Economic, Social and Environmental Council; representatives of high jurisdictions; and
appointed "qualified public figures."
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demanding that their laws regulating information likewise have global
reach?" 123 Walker warns of a "global race to the bottom," ultimately
resulting in French citizens being unable to see information that is
perfectly lawful to view in France. 1 2 4 Google further argues that its
current approach is effective in protecting the applicable right. It noted
that ninety-seven percent of French users access the search engine via
Google.fr-meaning that while not foolproof, the vast majority of
French users would not see the link.1 25
But Google lost, and in March 2016 it agreed to a compromise
measure. It now restricts access to the URL from any domain (including
google.com) if the search originates in the same country as the person
who requested the delinking. But it does not limit access on google.com
for those searching from other locations. 126 Thus, individuals from
Spain who type in Mr. Gonzalez's name will not pull up the articles
about his home auction, no matter what Google domain they use to do
so. Individuals in France, however, would not be able to access that
information using Google.fr, although they would be able to access it if
they instead used Google.com. The compromise, however, was not good
enough for the CNIL. It wants Google to remove the links from all
domains, regardless of the place of access. And it fined Google one
hundred thousand Euros for failing to do so. After pending before
France's highest administrative appeal court for months, the case has
xplicitly asking
now been referred to the European Court of Justice
the question of whether allegedly infringing material has to be removed
globally, or whether the takedowns can be limited to searches
emanating from the EU. 127
123. Alex Hern, Google Takes Right to Be Forgotten Battle to France's Highest Court,
GUARDIAN (May 19, 2016, 8:20 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/
19/google-right-to-be-forgotten-fight-france-highest-court [https://perma.cc/A4H3-7C5H].
124. Id.
125. Carol A.F. Umhoefer & Caroline Chance, Right to Be Forgotten:The CNIL Rejects Google
Inc.'s Appeal Against Cease and Desist Order, PRIVACY MATTERS (Sept. 22, 2015),
http://blogs.dlapiper.com/privacymatters/right-to-be-forgotten-the-enil-rejects-google-inc-sappeal-against-cease-and-desist-order/ [https://perma.cc/CQJ2-5G2Q].
126. Google uses geolocation tools to identify the location of the searcher. See European
Privacy FAQ, supra note 116.
127. See Conseil d'ttat [CE] [highest administrative court], July 19, 2017, 399922 (Fr.),
http://www.conseil-etat.fr/Decisions-Avis-Publications/Decisions/Selection-des-decisions-faisant-lobjet-d-une-communication-particuliere/CE-19-juillet-2017-GOOGLE-INC
[https://perma.ccl3BUM-A47U]. The case has spawned an active debate and commentary. While
privacy groups, free speech advocates, and academics support Google, many others disagree.
Compare Nani Jansen Reventlow et al., A French Court Case Against Google Could Threaten
Global Speech Rights, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/globalopinions/wp/2016/12/22/a-french-court-case-against-google-could-threaten-global-speechrights/?utmterm=.8923fa5e5261 [https://perma.cc/GVL6-LXGB] (supporting Google to avoid "a
precedent that others will inevitably use to censor search results they don't like"), with Frank
Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515, 517 (2015) ("Such removals
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This, of course, is not the first time in which France and the
United States have clashed over free speech rights. The Yahoo! case
over the sale of Nazi memorabilia-permitted in the United States but
prohibited in France-raises many of the same issues. Although Yahoo!
initially claimed that it could not technically block just French
residents' access to the relevant auction site, independent technical
experts revealed that it could do so with about ninety percent accuracy,
and it was ordered to adopt that technological solution. 12 8 That, in fact,
was the basic approach Google was attempting to replicate with respect
to the right to be forgotten-creating a differentiated access regime. But
CNIL has deemed this insufficient, asserting that individual rights will
be insufficiently protected if accessible at all.
There also is some precedent for what CNIL is requesting.
Pursuant to its U.S. copyright law obligations, Google, as well as other
U.S.-based providers, removes infringing material from all domain
levels, regardless of the location of the internet user. And it does so on
an order of magnitude greater than the delinkings associated with the
right to be forgotten. In December 2016 alone, for example, Google
removed over sixty-three million URLs based on an assessment that
they infringed copyrighted material. Compare this with the 1.8 million
URLs delinked pursuant to the right to be forgotten in more than twoand-a-half years. 129 Put another way, in a single month there were
thirty-five times more copyright-related takedowns than URLs delisted
in thirty-one months based on the right to be forgotten. Moreover,
whereas the information subject to the right to be forgotten is still
potentially available-just so long as it is accessed some other way than

are a middle ground between info-anarchy and censorship. They neither disappear information
from the Internet (it can be found at the original source), nor allow it to dominate the impression
of the aggrieved individual."); see also Farhad Manjoo, 'Right to Be Forgotten" Online Could
Spread,
N.Y.
TIMEs
(Aug.
5,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/technology/personaltech/right-to-be-forgotten-online-ispoised-to-spread.html? r=1 [https://perma.cc/XAC5-PSMF] (citing proponents on both sides).
128. See La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisdsmistisme (L.I.C.R.A.) et L'Union des
Etudiants Juifs de France (U.EJ.F.) c. Yahoo! Inc. et Soci6t6 Yahoo! France Interim Court Order,
Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000
(Fr.). Ultimately, however, Yahoo! caved, adopting a new policy that applied across the board (and
thus did not require filtering by geography) and would "no longer allow items that are associated
with groups which promote or glorify hatred and violence . . [including] Nazi militaria and KKK
memorabilia." Jeff Peline, Yahoo to Charge Auction Fees, Ban Hate Materials, CNET (Mar. 29,
2002),
https://www.cnet.comluk/news/yahoo-to-charge-auction-fees-ban-hate-materials/
[https://perma.cc/3JQK-T4J7].
129. Requests
to
Remove
Content
Due
to
Copyright,
GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/copyright/overview
(last
visited
Oct.
20,
2017)
[https://perma.cc/JQ5Q-5AGZ].
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via a search of the subject's name-information subject to copyrightbased takedowns are removed from all parts of Google's site. 130
There are, however, two key differences between the copyright
rules and the right to be forgotten as they are currently being applied.
First, the companies applying the copyright laws are mostly U.S.-based
and thus clearly bound by applicable U.S. law. One would similarly
expect Baidu, the Chinese-based search engine, to be bound by
takedown orders imposed by Chinese law. The analogous conflicts
emerge if every other country where Baidu operates also tried to impose
its vision of what information should and should not be accessible from
the site. 131
Second, and importantly, there is much greater international
consensus on what constitutes copyright infringement than on the right
to be forgotten, where there is a significant divergence of approaches.
The Berne Convention, which sets international standards for
intellectual property protection including copyright, has over 171
signatories. 132 While there remain sources of dispute, there is also a fair
amount of agreement. By comparison, it is hard to imagine even just
the EU and the United States reaching consensus as to what constitutes
a legitimate basis for content takedown given the divergent approaches
130. An analogous dispute is playing out in Canada and the United States, with Google
contesting a court order requiring it to delink all websites used by a company found to have
engaged in trade secrets and trademark violations. Google, as in the dispute with the CNIL,
delinked the websites from google.ca, but left them up on all other domain names. But the
Canadian Supreme Court deemed this insufficient and ordered Google to abide by its order across
all of its domains. Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 34, para. 41 (Can.), https://secOn
[https://perma.cc/L6VT-REMU].
csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/16701/l/document.do
November 2, 2017, a U.S. district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement
and adopting Google's position that the Canadian Supreme Court ruling "threatens free speech on
the global Internet." Google LLC v. Equustek Sols. Inc., No. 5:17-cv-04207-EJD, 2017 WL 5000834,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017); see also CanadianCourt Order CensoringEveryone's Google Search
Results Must Be Overturned, EFFTells Supreme Court of Canada, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOuND.
(Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/canadian-court-order-censoring-everyonesgoogle-search-results-must-be-overturned-eff [https://perma.cc/58MB-N9QQ].
131. There is an interesting and related question as to whether individuals have a First
Amendment right to have their speech available on particular search engines. A recent New York
District Court case says no. See Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(rejecting First Amendment challenge against Baidu brought by U.S.-based promoters of
democracy in China who claimed Baidu prevented their content from appearing on its search
engine).
132. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9,
1886, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. There is, however, not total consensus as to what constitutes
infringing material with respect to copyright or the scope of other intellectual property protections.
In fact, such disagreements have been the subject of high-stakes disputes and litigation. See, e.g.,
Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 34; Hamza Shaban, How a Supreme Court Case in Canada
Could Force Google to Censor Speech Worldwide, WASH. POST (June 29, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/06/29/how-a-supreme-court-case-incanada-could-force-google-to-censor-speech-worldwide/?utm-term=.2945a2829ca7/
[https://perma.cc/7NP4-QABC].
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to free speech-let alone the range of other nations that might want to
assert additional bases for content takedown based on potentially
offensive, unpopular, or political speech.
Meanwhile, the lack of clear standards with respect to what
constitutes legitimate grounds for asserting the right to be forgotten
means that companies such as Google are increasingly the ones setting
the rules-and thus determining the scope of available information on
a near-global scale. And because the decisions are discretionary and
made by a private company behind closed doors, it is hard to know how
these decisions are being made. While the data subject will know if his
or her request is denied, the broader public will likely not know if it is
granted, and thus has no mechanism for asserting a countervailing
right to be informed. 133
B. Privacy Regulations-the GDPR
The European Union's recently adopted and far-reaching new
data protection regulation-the General Data Protection Regulation
("GDPR")-will take effect in May 2018. In addition to the right to be
forgotten, the GDPR mandates a number of additional privacy and data
protection measures. Among other things, it increases the number of
disclosures that must be made before an entity can process personal
data; 1 3 4 lays out specific limitations on the cross-border transfer of data;
imposes relatively strict "consent" requirements for the processing of
certain personal data; 13 5 restricts the scope of permissible "profiling";13 6
obliges a range of companies to appoint data protection officers;1 37 and
includes new breach notification requirements.
As already described, these obligations have broad territorial
reach, covering entities that process the personal data of EU subjects,
irrespective of the location of the processor or controller, so long as the
processing activities are related to the "offering of goods or services" to
133. See Steven M. LoCascio, Note, Forcing Europe to Wear the Rose-Colored Google Glass:
The "Rightto Be Forgotten"andthe Struggle to Manage Compliance Post Google Spain, 54 COLUM.
J. TRANSNATL L. 296, 304-11 (2015) (raising concerns about the amount of power being delegated
to private companies to determine the scope of the right to be forgotten).
134. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 63, art. 15.
135. See id. arts. 7, 9.
136. See id. arts. 22, 24, 60, 63, 71, 73.
137. The obligation applies to those companies that engage in the "regular and systematic
monitoring of data subjects on a large scale" or large-scale processing of "special categories of data."
Id. art. 37; see also id. art. 39 (laying out responsibilities of data privacy officers). Although initial
drafts limited the obligation to companies of 250 employees or more, later regulations lifted that
limit. See Rita Heimes, Top 10 OperationalImpacts of the GDPR: Part 2, INT'L ASS'N PRIVACY
PROFS. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/altop- 10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-2-themandatory-dpo/ [https://perma.cc/C76G-FSXG].
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EU subjects, or "the monitoring of [the] behavior" of EU-based
subjects. 138 The GDPR thus represents one of an array of privacy
regulations with extraterritorial reach, applying its prescriptive
obligations not just on locally based companies but on companies
around the world that process EU subject data. Some of these
requirements can, as a matter of technology and practice, be
implemented in a way that is territorially limited (as Google is
attempting to do with respect to the right to be forgotten). But others,
such as the requirement of a data protection officer and the
implementation of protections required in order to transfer data across
borders, mandate the adoption of new procedures and protections that
cannot easily be constrained by territory. Any company that wants to
do business in the EU or transfer personal data out of the EU needs to
comply with these requirements or be subject to potentially large
fines. 1 39

This is in many ways the EU equivalent of the U.S. requirement
that all foreign governments get a U.S. . warrant to obtain
communications content for law enforcement purposes, regardless of
the particular equities at stake. 140 With respect to the warrant
requirement, the United States is imposing its substantive and
procedural warrant rules on the rest of the world-or at least any part
of the rest of the world that wants access to U.S.-held communications
content. With respect to the privacy regulations, the EU is using its
power as a key market to similarly impose its vision of appropriate
privacy regulations globally-not just with respect to the right to be
forgotten but with respect to a range of other privacy regulations as
well. It is an example of what Professor Anu Bradford has coined the
"Brussels effect"-the international version of the so-called "California
effect"-defined as local regulations with broad extraterritorial
effect.141 While not exactly the kind of global governance the
unterritorialists once advocated, it yields some of the same effects, but
via local, territorial controls, and mediated by the global corporations
that manage our data.

138. GDPR, supranote 63, art. 3(2).
139. This is part of a broader trend. See, e.g., Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, The (Uncertain)
Future of Online Data Privacy, 9 MASARYK U. J.L. & TECH. 129, 131 (2015) ("[W]hile exceptions
can be found (e.g. current Japanese data privacy law), there is a tendency of data privacy laws
around the world to adopt an extraterritorial scope so that European businesses doing business in
Australia or Singapore will be bound to abide by Australian and Singaporean data privacy law."
(citation omitted)).
140. See discussion supra Section I.A.
141. See Bradford, supranote 12, at 3.
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III. IMPLICATIONS

Having detailed specific areas in which these key jurisdictional
disputes are playing out, I now step back and examine some of the
broader themes and challenges that emerge. In so doing, I make three
key points.
First, territorial sovereigns continue to govern the internet, but
what is territorial and what is extraterritorial remain in sharp dispute.
Contrary to the claims of some, the distinct attributes of data and the
way it is managed raise unique considerations. 142 Simply applying the
rules governing other tangible and intangible assets is both
unsatisfying and unworkable. Not only are many of those rules
themselves unsettled and contested in key respects (particularly with
respect to intangible assets), but also there are key differences between
the management of personal data and things like patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and dollars. We need an understanding of how the relevant
attributes of data map onto the underlying normative goals that the
jurisdictional rules are trying to satisfy. Otherwise, we risk blithely
applying existing rules to a new medium in ways that fail to serve, or
potentially even undermine, the underlying goals.
Second, territorial-based regulations are increasingly having an
extraterritorial effect, providing a new form of global governance (or at
least attempted global governance), but via unilateral rulemaking.
Such forms of unilateral, extraterritorial rulemaking provide an
opportunity for states to use their leverage to prod international
partners to adopt the normative vision of the regulating state. This can
be used to encourage partner nations to be more rights or privacy
respecting, even in the absence of the kind of consensus that might lead
to direct bilateral or multilateral agreements. But it can also be used to
impose one set of values and preferences on others-in ways that cause
clashes and increasingly potent conflicts of laws. This of course is
neither a new phenomenon nor one that is unique to the field of data
regulation, but it is an issue that has particular resonance here given
the potentially profound implications for privacy, speech rights,
security, and democratic governance.
Third, key decisions as to whose rules apply and how they are
interpreted are increasingly being determined not by states, but by the
major multinational companies that operate across borders. In making
basic decisions about where to locate data and personnel, how to design
systems, and when to fight versus when to comply with court orders,
private companies are increasingly setting and interpreting the rules.
142. See, e.g., Woods, supra note 13, at 754-64.
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At times they are being explicitly delegated the authority to do so. 1 4 3 All
of this has significant implications for privacy, security, and speech
rights, as well as the relationship between the government and the
governed.
A. Defining Territoriality
The grand vision of a new global order to regulate the globaland unterritorial-medium of data flowing across the internet has not
come to pass. Rather, states have and will continue to find ways to
assert territorial-based controls on the data and providers that pass
through or operate in their states. (And this reality has its benefits,
particularly with respect to privacy rights.144) But what is territorial
and what is extraterritorial remains in sharp dispute, reflecting the
challenges and opportunities that arise from the efforts to impose
territorial-based controls on what is inherently an unterritorial
medium. In what follows, I highlight the relevant features of data that
need to be taken into account and then suggest how these features do
and should shape our assessment of what is territorial in the realm of
both enforcement and prescriptive jurisdiction.
1. Data's Differences
In an earlier article, I highlighted features of data that challenge
our conceptions of what is territorial and what is unterritorial. 1 4 5 In a
recent Stanford Law Review article, Professor Andrew Keane Woods
takes aim at my categorization of data as different. 146 In his view,
nothing is particularly new; we should simply look to the ways
jurisdictional issues have been worked out with respect to analogous
forms of both tangible and intangible property and we will have all the
answers needed. 147 Woods, however, mischaracterizes my key point and
glosses over the salient features of data that are creating the kinds of
conundrums this Article and prior work seeks to address.

143. See supra Section H.A.
144. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, An InternationalRight to Privacy?Be Careful What You
Wish For, 14 INT'L J. CONST. L. 238, 254-59 (2016) (warning that any attempt to reach mutually
agreed upon, globally applicable common ground on both privacy and speech rights will almost
certainly yield a race to the bottom versus the top and thus an ultimate reduction in core privacy
and speech rights for many); see also Daskal, supra note 13, at 395 (same). That said, there may
be the possibility of bilateral or multilateral cooperation, at least on some discrete issues. See
discussion supra Section I.A.4.b.
145. Daskal, supra note 13, at 365-77.
146. Woods, supra note 13, at 729, 734, 755.
147. Id. at 756-63, 764-74.
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First, contrary to Woods' argument, the claim that data is
different and that these differences challenge our assessment of
territoriality is not the same as saying that territorial-based efforts to
control and regulate are or should be jettisoned. Rather, it is an
acknowledgment that data raises difficult questions about the basic
understanding of what is a territorial versus extraterritorial basis of
jurisdiction with respect to data. Second, in focusing on the similarities
between data and other forms of tangible and intangible property-of
which there are of course many-Woods glosses over the key
differences. It is for good reason that numerous governments,
academics, and judicial bodies are actively struggling to define the key
jurisdictional limits to both enforcement and prescriptive jurisdiction
over data. The answers are not at all clear.
In what follows, I briefly reiterate the attributes of data I
highlighted in previous work-namely its mobility, divisibility, location
independence, and fact of third-party control-explain why these
attributes matter and counter the argument that it is nothing new.
First, data's mobility: as Woods points out, data is not the only
kind of property that is highly mobile. 14 8 People and other forms of
tangible property cross borders. But both humans and other forms of
tangible, tactile property do so in relatively predictable, observable
ways. Data by contrast moves at the speed of light, in ways that are
totally unpredictable and generally unknown to both the data subject
and the governments seeking to access sought-after data. This, both
independently and in conjunction with the other unique features of data
described below, makes data location a particularly unstable basis for
defining territoriality or delimiting enforcement jurisdiction.
It also means, as we have seen in the discussions of the Microsoft
Ireland case and blocking provisions imposed by U.S. and EU law, that
jurisdictional rules that turn on the location of data fail to serve key
normative and practical interests at stake.149 Simply put, there is an
increasing mismatch between where data happens to be located and the
sovereign and other relevant interests at stake. As a practical matter,
such a rule fails to address what the EU describes as "loss of location"meaning that in many cases neither the state nor the data subject
knows the relevant location of data at any given point in time.1 50

148. Id. at 758.
149. See discussion supra Section I.A.
150. As discussed earlier, Google, for example, moves data around by algorithm, based on an
array of performance, reliability, and other efficiency concerns. See In re Search Warrant No. 16960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 712-13 (E.D. Pa. 2017); In re Search of Content that is
Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, No. 16-mc-80263-LB, 2017 WL 1487625, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 25, 2017).
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Second, data's divisibility: it is true, as Woods points out, that
even if people and other goods cross borders in a more predictable,
plodding manner, there are other assets, like money and debt, that
operate as a form of data and thus move around the globe at the speed
of light. 151 According to Woods, we should therefore simply look to the
jurisdictional rules governing money. 152 But there is also a key
difference between rapidly moving communications content and rapidly
moving money. Money and debt are rivalrous assets. They can only be
held (even if converted into Os and Is on a bank's balance sheet) in a
single location at a time. Data, by comparison, can be unilaterally
copied and held in multiple jurisdictions at once, without altering in
any meaningful way the nature of the data or the data subject's ability
to access or manipulate it. This distinction matters.
Let's consider one of Woods' key hypotheticals. Woods points to
the fact that the ten dollars that John Smith deposits in the bank is not
likely the same ten dollars he receives when he later withdraws the
money. The particular ten dollars has likely been divided and
distributed and might have even been exchanged for foreign
currency. 15 3 But, critically, there is still a single ten dollars-in
whatever form-linked to John Smith. John Smith's money may have
been divided and re-distributed, but it cannot be multiplied, at least not
without the bank or John engaging in some sort of fraudulent activity.
If John Smith's ten dollars is seized by a government, it is no longer
available to him. Or if John Smith later withdraws his ten dollars in
the equivalent amount of pesos in Mexico, he cannot later also withdraw
the ten dollars in the United States.
Data is different. It can be divided, distributed, multiplied,
accessed, copied, and subsequently manipulated by multiple different
parties, without in any way interfering with the original data subject's
ability to use or access it. It can, for example, be held in multiple
different jurisdictions and be subject to simultaneous seizure by
multiple different law enforcement agencies in a way that money, debt,
or other forms of property cannot. It can be "seized" by State A, yet still
available, unaltered in any meaningful way, for State B to
simultaneously or subsequently seize.
This matters to both the enforcement and regulatory
jurisdictional issues addressed in this Article. Whereas law
enforcement agents in State A might have a legitimate sovereign
interest in protecting $10,000 from a locally held bank account being
151. See Woods, supra note 13, at 758-59.
152. Id. at 759-60.
153. Id.
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siphoned off by State B, the sovereign interest that is impinged upon by
the mere act of copying a piece of data is minimal, to the extent it exists
at all. A state's sovereign interests arise from other equities than the
need to ensure access for itself-perhaps, for example, an interest in
protecting the privacy of one's own citizens and residents or a normative
interest in baseline privacy protections. Understanding these
underlying equities is critical to the development of sound jurisdictional
rules.
The divisibility of data also matters for another reason. It means
that a particular source of data, or link on a search engine, can be taken
down from one domain (such as google.es) without in any way changing
the ability to access the same information from another server where it
might be held on another domain (such as google.com). Conversely, it
means that if it is not also taken down from google.com, or deleted more
widely, it can likely be accessed by some, including at least some subset
of the population that a government might want to prevent from
accessing it. This obviously has important implications for the
regulation of copyright infringement, libel, terrorist use of the internet,
and, of course, the right to be forgotten. States seeking to limit access
to content in these situations have one of two choices. They can accept
that territorial-based limits on speech come with the possibility of
evasion. Or they can, as the CNIL is doing, insist that the infringing
content be deleted from all applicable servers or delinked from all
search engine domains-and in so doing impose its normative vision on
a global, or near-global, scale. 154
Third, location independence: data can be accessed and
manipulated remotely. This means that a data subject can be separated
from the data he or she is manipulating by an international border. It
also means that both law enforcement agents and service providers
acting as agents of law enforcement can access data across borders
without ever setting foot in the foreign country. Once again, there are
similarities with money. One might live in the United States and store
one's money in an offshore account but access it from an ATM in New
York City. But there is a key difference that ties back to data's
divisibility: once money is accessed and retrieved, it is no longer
available in that offshore account. Law enforcement can, by contrast,
access and copy data without excluding others or interfering with the
data subject's ability to access it.

154. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1159-60
(2007) (making a similar point with respect to France's case against Yahoo! over the availability
of Nazi memorabilia and Holocaust denial material).
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Location independence also matters to our understanding of
both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. Providers based
exclusively in State A can provide a whole host of services in State B
without ever setting foot in State B. Evolving jurisdictional rules seek
to reflect this reality; states are concerned that providers will escape
regulation and other legal responsibilities simply because they are not
territorially located there. In response, Belgium's assertion of
jurisdiction in the Skype and Yahoo! cases, EU's new GDPR
regulations, and the Council of Europe's proposed guidance on Article
18 of the Budapest Convention all adopt broad-reaching assertions of
both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction that focus on the place
where providers "orient" their activities or offer their services, rather
than the place where either the provider or data is located. This also
tracks the way U.S. courts have been establishing jurisdiction over
internet providers in a range of civil cases.15 5 It also increases the
likelihood of territorial-based regulation with broad extraterritorial
effect.
Fourth, third-party control: the location of data is increasingly
controlled by third parties, as exemplified by the Microsoft Irelandcase.
The user generally does not pick the location where it is held, and thus
there may be no normative link between a data subject and the location
where his or her data happens to be held. This is a very different
situation than when one purchases a house in, physically travels to, or
opens an offshore bank account in a particular location. In those
situations, one chooses the place and implicitly agrees to abide by the
relevant jurisdiction's law, even if it is a remote jurisdiction. With data,
there is often no equivalent choice being made by the relevant property
owner and thus no notice about, or control over, the rules that
potentially govern access to the data.
This has two key implications. First, it raises concerns about fair
notice and accountability. If users do not know where their data is
located and thus who has control over it, they have no way of holding
governments accountable. Second, it means that in the absence of
mandatory
data
localization
requirements,
transnational
corporations-rather than either data holders or governmental actorsmake the key decisions about where to locate data, and thus, to the

155. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(establishing what is known as the "Zippo test"-a sliding scale test for establishing jurisdiction
on the Internet based on the degree of contract between the plaintiff and company's website).
Several circuit courts have since adopted either this or a modified version of this test. See, e.g.,
Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Dig.
Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Mark A. Lemley, Place and
Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 529-30 (2003).
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extent that data location governs, the rules that apply. EU effortsunder both the current Data Privacy Regulation and soon-to-be
implemented GDPR-to demand the implementation of basic privacy
protections as a condition for permitting the flow of data outside the
EU's borders represent a direct response to this reality, reflecting an
effort to reassert territorial control by limiting the flow of data from the
EU to elsewhere absent some "adequacy" determination with respect to
the privacy rules and security protections in place.
These attributes of data, both individually and collectively,
matter to the assessment of the relevant sovereignty and other key
interests at stake; this in turn should be taken into account in
determining the jurisdictional rules that apply. I turn to this task now.
2. Territoriality and Enforcement Jurisdiction
What is clear from this discussion is that the simple mapping of
rules governing other forms of tangible and intangible property does not
work either practically or normatively. Whereas there is a clear
international law prohibition on law enforcement in State A
unilaterally accessing property in State B, an equivalent rule with
respect to data creates a mismatch between the underlying sovereign
interests and jurisdictional rules that apply. In response, states have
developed a smorgasbord approach to assessing enforcement
jurisdiction-with some continuing to reify the location of data, others
focusing on the location of the provider that controls the data, still
others looking to the place where data is either received or disclosed,
and some adopting a combination of the above. What is needed is a
better mapping of the jurisdictional rules with the sovereign and other
normative interests at stake. This in turn requires a theory of what does
and does not constitute a legitimate sovereign interest and what other
relevant interests should be considered-a tricky, contested, and
complex set of issues.
For these purposes, I offer an initial assessment of the key
interests at stake-recognizing that such an assessment is itself
deserving of its own series of articles and books. My goal here is to
simply outline how one would think about these interests in connection
to the relevant jurisdictional rules; the specifics will shift depending on
one's assessment of these baseline claims and their relative importance.
With those caveats in mind, I proffer that there are, as a general
matter, at least five key interests at stake with respect to law
enforcement efforts to access data. First, states have a sovereign
interest in preventing and prosecuting crime. Second, states have a
sovereign interest in protecting their citizens and residents, and thus
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limiting or controlling the ability of foreign governments to unilaterally
access citizen or resident data. Third, states have a broader interest in
setting baseline substantive and procedural protections to govern
access to data globally-an interest justified both by normative
preferences and by the narrower interest of protecting citizen and
resident data that might be intermingled with a legitimate foreign
target's data. Fourth, states have an interest in protecting the economic
interests of local companies. And fifth, separate and apart from the
state interest, the individual data subject has an interest in protecting
his or her privacy, protecting against abuse, and having some
knowledge and control (via democratic processes or otherwise) over the
rules that apply.
A location-of-data test, such as that provided by the Microsoft
Ireland case or U.S. blocking provisions, fails to serve most of these key
interests. First, it stymies law enforcement access to data in legitimate
investigations based simply on where the data happens to be held. In
most cases, those location decisions are based on providers' efforts to
maximize efficiency and reduce cost, rather than other normative
considerations. Second, a location-based rule fails to reflect the state's
interest in protecting its own residents and citizens and instead sets
arbitrary limits on a government's ability to access data based on
business decisions of providers. Third, such a rule does nothing to
promote the development of baseline rules; rather, it simply defers to
the procedural and substantive rules that apply in the nation where the
data is located, no matter how weak they are. Fourth, to the extent that
a location-based rule encourages data localization mandates as a means
of ensuring local law enforcement access, such rules are harmful both
to the future growth of the internet and to the state's own providers. In
requiring providers to cache local copies of data, governments
significantly increase the costs of doing business for providers that
operate multinationally and potentially price startups out of the
international market.
The one key interest that is potentially aided by such a locationbased rule is notice to the data subject, which can help the individual
user protect his or her privacy (the fifth interest outlined above). One
could imagine that, if a location-based jurisdiction approach became the
stable norm, data subjects would increasingly demand notice and choice
regarding data location. This would require a shift in practice; as of
now, most users that rely on third-party providers to store or manage
their data lack notice, choice, and even the ability to ascertain where
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their data is located at any given moment.156 If implemented widely,
however, a location-based approach would provide some increased
predictability as to the rules that apply, which in turn would provide
the clarity needed to protect privacy and prevent abuse, albeit at the
cost of other key interests.
Conversely, a give-us-everything approach, as exemplified by
the Belgian courts' approach to enforcement jurisdiction, advances the
sovereign interest in investigating and prosecuting crime but fails to
serve other relevant, key interests. In setting a standard that any state
can demand the production of data of anyone, anywhere, this approach
fails to respect other states' countervailing interests in limiting or
controlling foreign government access to their own citizens' or residents'
data. It fails to provide any kind of baseline procedural or substantive
protection; rather, all that matters is that the state claims a
justification for accessing the data. It also imposes economic risk on
locally based providers that operate multinationally; given the
continued reality of blocking statutes, such an approach puts providers
at risk of being caught in the middle of two conflicting legal obligations,
with one state asserting the right to access data and the other
prohibiting such disclosure. Finally, it fails to serve the individual
interest in either notice or choice; users will likely have no way of
knowing or controlling when governments access their data and for
what reasons, absent a voluntary decision on the part of the provider to
disclose. 157
Discussions in the EU and Council of Europe, as well as draft
legislation in the United States, recognize the need for a more nuanced
approach that mediates between these two extremes. While still in their
beginning stages, these efforts seek to better balance the competing
interests at stake and reflect a growing awareness of the value of
harmonizing approaches across borders. 15 8 In particular, the approach
taken by the United States in negotiations with the United Kingdom,
156. A company like Microsoft is starting to provide such location-driven options, particularly
with respect to its enterprise customers that want, or are required by local law, to keep data locally.
But this is not possible for a company like Google or Facebook-at least not without a major
overhaul of their business. These companies regularly move data for a whole host of productivity
and efficiency reasons and thus cannot easily ensure that customers' data remain in any one
particular location or give customers such locational choices. See In re Search Warrant, 232 F.
Supp. 3d at 724-25.
157. Of additional concern, providers are often explicitly barred from informing their
customers that their data have been seized. While a temporary prohibition on disclosure often
makes sense as a means of protecting the integrity of an investigation, indefinite bars on disclosure
are not. For a discussion of these issues, at least under U.S. law, see Jennifer Daskal, Notice and
Standing in the Fourth Amendment: Searches of Personal Data, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
(forthcoming 2018).
158. See discussion supra Section I.A.4.

2018]

BORDERS AND BITS

229

and the accompanying draft legislation, reflects the key interests
identified. Such an approach seeks to ease limits on law enforcement
access to communications content, thus better facilitating the ability to
investigate and prosecute crime. Yet it also recognizes that states have
a legitimate interest in restricting access to their own citizens' and
residents' data. Moreover, it demands the application of baseline
substantive and procedural rules as a precondition to access, thereby
reflecting the normative interest in minimum privacy interests and the
more self-serving interest in protecting the data of the state's own
citizens that might be intermingled (incidentally collected) with the
data that a foreign government is requesting. This approach is of course
not perfect, as virtually nothing in this area will be. There are, for
example, active and ongoing debates about the particular procedural
and substantive standards required. 15 9 And it is unclear whether and
how such an approach could be scalable beyond a relatively small
handful of like-minded nations.
But it is nonetheless a step forward. If enacted, the legislation
would represent a much better alignment of the jurisdictional rules
with the relevant interests at stake than currently exists. It reflects an
effort to facilitate states' legitimate interest in investigating and
prosecuting crime, while also respecting states' interests in controlling
access to their own citizens' and residents' data. It seeks to harmonize
approaches across borders, thus minimizing conflict and reducing the
likelihood that companies will be caught in a conflict of laws. And it
uses the United States' leverage as the holder of so much of the world's
data to push norm development in ways that ultimately inure to its
citizens' and residents' benefit, even if they are not the direct target of
a foreign government's search or seizure.16 0 If successful, it could
provide a model for reform efforts elsewhere.

Remote searches of extraterritorially located data and devices
performed directly by law enforcement also raise a similar set of
challenges to our assessment of what is territorial, what is
extraterritorial, and what constitute the key sovereign interests at
stake. The prospect of law enforcement officials reaching across
borders, albeit remotely, to unilaterally access property in another
jurisdiction is both disconcerting and widely deemed a violation of
sovereignty. At the same time, it is hard to explain why the inadvertent
159. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
160. See discussion supra Section I.A.4.c.
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accessing and copying of data that happens to be located in a foreign
jurisdiction is inherently a sovereignty violation, particularly if coupled
by after-the-fact notice once the data location has been discovered.
The approach suggested by the Cloud Evidence Group seems to
recognize this. It would explicitly authorize cross-border searches by
law enforcement if inadvertent or in an emergency situation.161 Notice
to the host government if and when it becomes apparent that the data
or device is outside the acting state's territorial jurisdiction would be
required.
A similar set of rules also should be enacted by the United States
to deal with the possibility of remote searches reaching
extraterritorially located data or devices pursuant to the recent
revisions to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Notice
to the target government generally should be required. If the target
government objects, the searching government should be obliged to
abandon or cease its activity in such a situation and possibly be
prohibited from introducing already seized data in a criminal case.
That said, there may be times when it would unduly jeopardize
an investigation to notify the host government of the law enforcement
actions taken. Here, I would borrow from the international law on
countermeasures, as articulated in the 2001 Articles on State
Responsibility. 162 The default rule is that if State A is planning certain
actions known as countermeasures in State B, State A is required to
notify State B in advance. 16 3 If, however, "urgent countermeasures . .
are necessary to preserve [the state's] rights," notice is not required. 164
The commentary notes that notice can be suspended if it would
"frustrate" the acting state's purposes. 165
For obvious reasons, there are situations in which notification of
hacking activities to the target country would similarly frustrate the
legitimate law enforcement activities of the notifying state. Consider,
for example, a situation involving state-sponsored or state-sanctioned
illegal activity. Notice to the target state would risk upending the
investigation. In those narrow situations, states should be permitted to
engage in no-notice searches without running afoul of international
law. That said, notice and cooperation should be the rule.
In sum, the jurisdictional rules governing law enforcement
access to data-both with respect to compelled disclosure orders and

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See discussion supra Section I.B.2.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
Id. art. 52(1).
Id. art. 52(2).
Id. art. 52, cmt. 6.
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efforts at direct access-should map as closely as possible onto the
sovereign and related interests at stake. These interests are themselves
in internal tension, exacerbating the difficulty of this task. But a few
things seem clear: A test that focuses exclusively on the location of data
fails to reflect the actual attributes of data in ways that are incongruent
with the relevant interests at stake. Conversely, a test that gives law
enforcement access to whatever it deems relevant to an investigation,
without regard to countervailing considerations, is not a satisfactory
answer either. Such an approach fails to take into account the
countervailing sovereign interests in limiting access to citizens' and
residents' data and controlling foreign state activity in their borders. It
also fails to reflect both the sovereign and broader normative interests
in setting baseline procedural and substantive protections as to the
rules that apply. The goal should be a set of jurisdictional rules that fall
in between these two approaches-ones that reflect both the legitimate
sovereign interest in sometimes accessing data outside a state's borders
and the countervailing interests in limiting access to citizens' and
residents' data; promote the implementation of baseline substantive
and procedural privacy protections; and facilitate user notice with
respect to the rules that apply.
3. Territoriality and Prescriptive Jurisdiction
The questions of prescriptive jurisdiction are much less
contested than those involving enforcement jurisdiction. A range of
developments in the EU, Council of Europe, ECJ, and elsewhere
suggest an increasing consensus in favor of broad reach of prescriptive
jurisdiction to cover a provider offering services in one's territory, even
if the provider does not have a territorial presence in terms of personnel
or place of operations. This reflects the fact that providers increasingly
can manage data across borders and have local effect without ever
setting foot in the territory where their data is located-a consequence
of what I call location independence.
While providers have at times contested the wide scope of
prescriptive jurisdiction, they have generally consented to the states'
jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. In the Yahoo!, Skype, and right
to be forgotten cases involving Google, for example, major multinational
corporations have appeared in court and paid fines and other penalties
when ordered to do so. 166 And this is perhaps wise. After all, states have
all kinds of tools to enforce compliance, even in situations where the
provider is not physically located in their territory. States can, for
166. See supra Sections I.A.1, I.A.2, II.A.
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example, block the availability of certain services; prohibit residents
from using certain services; or seek, via mutual cooperation, seizure of
assets with the assistance of states where the provider is physically
located. 167 The result of such broad assertions of jurisdiction is the
growing phenomenon of extraterritorial regulation via territorial rule.
It is to these developments that I now turn.
B. ExtraterritorialRegulation via TerritorialRulemaking
The interconnected nature of data, the transnational workings
of the providers that control and manage our data, and broad assertions
of prescriptive jurisdiction together yield opportunities for states to
regulate with far-reaching extraterritorial effect. This has several
implications of importance for the issues discussed here. First, whereas
the unterritorialists' vision of new supranational institutions to
regulate the internet has not come to pass, there is an alternative form
of international standard-setting via local regulation now taking
place. 168 It is what Professor Anu Bradford has coined the "Brussels
effect"-the international version of the so-called "California effect,"
pursuant to which California's regulatory practices set standards
ultimately applicable across other states, even if not mandated by other
states or the federal government.169 It operates this way: regulation in
one state yields the adoption of uniform standards that have farreaching effects, far beyond the boundaries of the regulating state.
The EU's broad assertions of privacy and security regulations
that reach every company that processes EU residents' data is an
obvious example. The GDPR's required appointment of a Data
Protection Officer, for example, is likely to yield privacy benefits that
extend far beyond the territorial boundaries of the EU. 170 Data security
requirements will have wide-spread effects as well. 171 Rules demanding
"adequate safeguards" before personal data can be transferred outside
the EU also indirectly impose EU-style privacy standards on just about
any company that wants to operate globally, including within the EU.1 72

167. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 2.

168. See Bradford, supra note 12, at 5. As Bradford points out, such efforts work best when
there is, among other things, a strong domestic market (here the EU), significant regulatory
capacity, and nondivisible conduct or production, meaning it is not feasible or viable for private
sector actors to maintain different standards across different markets. Id.
169. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2016) (describing in detail how California's privacy policies were
exported across the United States).
170. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 63, arts. 37-39.
171. Id. arts. 32-34.
172. Id. art. 45.; see also id. arts. 44, 46.
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Copyright rules imposed by the United States and implemented by U.S.
companies offer another example, with the United States' vision of what
constitutes infringing material-and thus what is subject to takedown
requests-being imposed on the rest of the globe via the operations of
U.S.-based providers.
This provides a new form of international rulemaking, but
through the de facto operation of the market and the multinational
corporations that operate across borders-rather than the more formal
and mutually agreed upon process of treaty making amongst states or
international organizations setting standards that impose obligations
on participating states. In many instances, multinational companies
that operate across borders, sub silentio, adapt to the more stringent
regulations in ways that ultimately apply to all of their operations, and
not just the operations in the regulating state.
Other times, regulations in one state can effectively coerce
another state to adapt. EU-wide restrictions on transferring personal
data outside the EU, for example, have led the United States to adopt
new rules and regulations designed to protect the free flow of data from
the EU to the United States. The extension of the Judicial Redress Act
to cover Europeans was a direct response to the demands of the
Europeans in this regard. The interest in preserving the free flow of
data also incentivized the adoption of Presidential Policy Directive-28,
which established new protections for foreigners' data acquired for
foreign intelligence purposes.173 Even the prospect of facilitated access
to U.S.-held data reportedly incentivized the U.K. government to
support new judicial review mechanisms-needed in order to be eligible
to take advantage of a still-to-be implemented data sharing agreement
that would allow U.K. officials to directly compel certain
communications content from U.S.-based providers.
But such efforts at extraterritorial rulemaking can also yield
conflict, depending on what is being regulated and the relevant
interests at stake. Disputes over the right to be forgotten are a case in
point. If the CNIL wins the case, it will effectively be imposing its view
of what constitutes a legitimate delinking request globally (assuming
Google complies). Conversely, if CNIL loses, it will be unable to fully
vindicate what it deems a key right. Instead, the United States-via the
decisions made by Google-will be imposing its view of how the public's
right to know should be implemented in the EU.

173. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Presidential Policy Directive-Signals
Intelligence Activities (PPD-28) (Jan. 17, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressofflce/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities
[https://perma.cc/8HGM-EJZ6].
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U.S. requirements that foreign governments meet U.S.
standards in order to access U.S.-held communications content are
likewise causing direct conflict with key foreign partners. These
requirements are seen by key partners as an imperialistic effort to
impose the U.S. standard of a warrant based on probable cause, even
on foreign states trying to access their own citizens' data in the
investigation of local crime. And like other types of unilateral
foreign
the
requirements
that
rulemaking,
extraterritorial
governments follow U.S. rules are inherently antidemocratic. 1 74 They
also generate direct conflict of laws when foreign states insist that
providers disclose the very same data that U.S. law prohibits them from
turning over.
In some subset of cases, such clashes may help to bring two or
more states to the table to work out their differences directly. This is an
example of unilateral global rulemaking leading to bilateral or
multilateral consensus building. The United States and United
Kingdom, for example, were incentivized to devise a new scheme for law
enforcement access to data because, in part, there was a direct conflict
between U.K. and U.S. law-with U.K. law permitting extraterritorial
jurisdiction over stored communications content and U.S. law
prohibiting providers from directly disclosing U.S.-held data. Broad
assertions of law enforcement jurisdiction by the Belgians that at times
have conflicted with other states' laws have helped put the issue of law
enforcement jurisdiction high on the EU's agenda. Similarly, EU
privacy regulations, which require compliance with a long list of
requirements before companies can transfer a range of data from the
EU to the U.S., have brought EU and U.S. negotiators together and led
to some modest changes in U.S. law-all in an effort to protect the
ability of companies to transfer data across borders.
Whether or not such unilateral global rulemaking is normatively
desirable depends significantly on what is being regulated and how. My
point here is not to take a normative stand. My goal here is simply to
highlight-joining many others that have done so before me-the
increasing possibility and reality of territorial regulation and
rulemaking with broad extraterritorial effect. Thus, while the
unterritorialists' vision of new supranational institutions and internet
governance has not come to pass, there is a new form of global
rulemaking and regulation being carried out via local regulation and
law. It operates via the unilateral exercise of authority by one state

174. For some, this makes any such effort at unilateral global rulemaking suspect. See, e.g.,
Parrish, supra note 12, at 856-74. My view is that the verdict is more mixed-although my goal
here is merely to examine the various implications rather than take a normative stand.
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combined with market forces and the multinational nature of the actors
being regulated. When effective, it can lead to harmonization of
practices across borders and, perhaps, increased protections for all.
When ineffective, however, it can yield a potentially destabilizing clash
of norms and legal obligations-pushing practices in a direction that
contradicts a state's own norms and values.
Moreover, multinational corporations, rather than governments,
are often the key players in determining whose rules gain dominance
and how. I turn to the implications of that reality now.
C. Role of the Private Sector
As this discussion highlights, such forms of unilateral, global
rulemaking are mediated through private sector actors rather than
states or international institutions, making the private sector a central
player in deciding whose rules apply and thus the scope of privacy and
speech rights on a global scale. When Mark Zuckerberg compared
Facebook to a government, he was not exaggerating. 175 But it is a
government that is neither democratically elected nor democratically
accountable, at least in the traditional way of individuals going to the
voting booth and choosing or rejecting particular candidates. A range of
private decisions, including where to locate data, where to locate
personnel, how to structure technology, when to fight and when to
comply with government demands, and whether to enter (or pull out of)
a particular market, all determine the security of our data and set
privacy and speech rights on a global scale. This in turn has profound
implications for the possibility of democratic accountability,
highlighting the need for alternative forms of accountability and
oversight of the private institutions that wield so much power.
The fight over and implementation of the right to be forgotten
provides one particularly notable example of the power being wielded
by the private sector. In deciding to fight the request, Google sought to
impose its vision of what is and is not a legitimate takedown request.
(Presumably Google also thought a high-profile fight-and win-would
protect them from other attempts at government censorship.) It could,
however, have simply chosen to quietly comply-and the fact of both the
request and Google's compliance likely would never have been publicly
known. It could, in fact, still change its approach and decide to delist all
of the data from the google.com site, without in any way running afoul
of U.S. or other legal obligations.

175. See FOER, supra note 6, at 61.
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Meanwhile, as Google seeks to implement the right to be
forgotten, it is doing so with minimal oversight. In fact, the ECJ ruling
effectively dictated this result when it placed the initial obligation to
delist on Google, rather than some public or quasi-public body. Google's
decisions have no precedential value and are not published anywhere.
And while a data subject can complain to a government entity-the
Data Protection Authority, for example-that his or her request is
denied, there does not appear to be any mechanism for a member of the
general public to either know about a decision to delink information or
object to such a decision. 176
The dispute over the right to be forgotten is just one of many
examples of major multinational companies battling the government
and shaping the rules in the process.1 77 Lawsuits by Microsoft over gag
orders issued in conjunction with search warrants, 178 by Apple over
decryption orders, 1 7 9 and by Yahoo! over the scope of foreign intelligence
surveillance1 8 0 all offer additional examples of company decisions to
protest that have led to significant changes in surveillance policy. The
Microsoft Ireland case is yet another.1 8 1 But nothing compelled the
private sector to fight in any of these cases. They did so for a
combination of normative and business reasons. Challenging the U.S.
government is good for corporate image and thus good for business,
particularly in the wake of the Edward Snowden revelations.
But just as there are a handful of instances in which the
corporations have chosen to fight, there are countless others where
companies have willingly cooperated. With the simple decision to
comply or resist law enforcement (and other) demands for data, these
companies play an enormous role in setting the scope of privacy and
speech rights on a global or near-global scale. After all, the five biggest
U.S. tech companies, for example, receive well over one hundred
176. Notably, Brazil's highest court for nonconstitutional questions, the Superior Court of
Justice, recently rejected the right to be forgotten precisely because of the concern as to how much
power would be delegated to private decisionmakers. According to the Brazilian court, such
private-sector adjudication of the right turns search engines into "digital censors." See Glyn Moody,
Senior Brazilian Court Says 'Right to Be Forgotten" Cannot Be Imposed on Search Engines,
TECHDIRT
(Nov.
29,
2016,
3:25
AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20161123/09244936123/senior-brazilian-court-says-right-to-beforgotten-cannot-be-imposed-search-engines.shtml [https://perma.cc/X3T5-XJVC].
177. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (analyzing how companies such as Facebook, Apple, and Google function as surveillance
intermediaries to constrain government surveillance).
178. Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017).
179. Clark D. Cunningham, Apple and the American Revolution: Remembering Why We Have
the Fourth Amendment, 126 YALE L.J. FORuM 216, 216-17 (2016).
180. In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
181. See discussion supra Section I.A. 1.
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thousand requests every six months for such information from
governments all around the world. 182 Combined, they produce data in
response to approximately fifty to seventy-five percent of those
requests. In so doing, they are independently deciding what standards
to apply in evaluating the requests, what requests meet those
standards, and how much information should be provided in
response. 18 3
In other situations, companies are effectively forced into
choosing whose law to favor. Consider, for example, the conflict of laws
caused by one state asserting broad extraterritorial jurisdiction to
compel the production of data located in another state's territory and
countervailing blocking provisions prohibiting disclosure in the state
where the data is found. The provider then has to decide: Whose law
should I violate and whose should I comply with? A number of practical
considerations are likely to dictate the result: With which state does the
provider have stronger ties and greater business interests? What is the
penalty of noncompliance? The decision is of course shaped by the
relative coercive powers of the states. But it is ultimately a decision for
the private corporation.

The amount of power wielded by major multinational
corporations has profound implications for how one thinks about
promoting data security and safeguarding privacy and speech rights.
Governments are no longer the primary, or in some cases even the
central, actor. Their role is both supplemented and sometimes
supplanted by the private actors that manage our data and mediate
conflicting legal obligations across borders. Moreover, in many cases
governments are no longer operating in direct interaction with their

MICROSOFT,
Enforcement
Requests
Report,
182. See,
e.g.,
Law
(last visited
Oct. 20,
2017)
https://www.microsoft.com/about/csr/transparencyhub/lerr/
[https://perma.cclVEM4-4L79] (select "2016 (Jul-Dec)" filter); Report on Government Information
Requests: January 1 - June 30, 2016, APPLE, http://images.apple.com/legal/privacy/transparency/
requests-2016-H1-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/883E-QAYV]; Transparency
Report: Government Data Requests, YAHOO!, https://transparency.yahoo.com/government-datarequests/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8JLU-SY2N]; Transparency
Report:
Requests
for
User
Information,
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/ countries/?p=2016-06 (last visited
Oct. 20, 2017) [https://perma.ce[NER8-EG3B].
183. In fact, frustration over the lack of clarity and consistency across providers as to how
these decisions are being made has resulted in an EC-led initiative to engage in standard-setting
with respect to the disclosure of such subscriber information. See EUR. COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 62, at 7 (disclosure determinations "regulated only through individual company policy on the
provider side, [are] not predictable and thus not reliable for either side").
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citizenry. Governmental searches, seizures, and takedown requests are
increasingly directed at private, third-party providers, rather than
directly targeted at the individual object of a search, seizure, or
takedown request. This suggests the need for new types of
accountability measures focused on the powerful private actors that
manage so much of our data. Here, I very briefly suggest three,
although this is just the beginning of the conversation; it is an area that
requires much more thought and analysis than is possible here.
First, mandatory and detailed transparency reporting
requirements are a start. Such reporting helps inform the public and
thus allows those individual consumers that do care enough to "vote" by
choosing the company that manages their data in a way consistent with
their norms and preferences. The effectiveness of such measures
depends, of course, on how much the public is willing to scrutinize the
reports and make decisions about what products to buy and services to
use as a result. But even if only a small subset of the population cares
enough to do so, the small subset can have an amplifying effect if it is
sufficiently vocal.
Second, public-private partnerships that establish best practices
and certify companies that abide by them provide another means of
oversight and standard-setting. The Global Network Initiative ("GNI"),
launched in 2008, provides a model for what this kind of public-private
partnership could look like. It is a multistakeholder initiative involving
private companies, civil society groups, academics, and other
individuals working together to promote "global digital rights"including privacy and freedom of expression. By bringing these various
actors together, there is the possibility of both establishing best
practices and holding the companies involved to account.
In fact, companies that participate in the GNI have consistently
been top rated in the annual Ranking Digital Rights 2017 Corporate
Accountability Index. 184 The structure is in place for the GNI to play an
increasingly active role in standard-setting, although as with all such
voluntary compliance measures the efforts are only as good as the
incentives for compliance.
Third, increased insistence on notice requirements in a range of
different contexts could prove helpful. Notice to users when
governments access their data helps ensure that users have some
ability to monitor and respond to potentially excessive demands for
their information. And while there are often legitimate reasons to delay
184. GNI Companies Again Top Ranking Digital Rights 2017 CorporateAccountability Index,
GLOBAL

NETWORK

INITIATIVE

(Mar.

23,

2017,

12:42),

https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/news/gni-companies-again-top-ranking-digital-rights2017-corporate-accountability-index [https://perma.cc/N83E-G9YZ].
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notice in order to preserve the integrity of an investigation, there is no
sound justification for an indefinite refusal or prohibition on such
disclosure.
As discussed in the section on remote searches, notice to other
governments also can help to ensure transparency about when and for
what reasons governments are accessing data of other states' residents
and citizens. This information, in turn, can provide the basis for
standard-setting across international borders.
Similarly, notice to the producer of information, whenever
known, should also be the default rule with respect to takedown
requests, albeit again with carve-outs for reasons of national security
and privacy.
To be clear, these are initial recommendations meant to spur
further conversation. There simply is no one-size-fits-all answer to the
question of how to best regulate the private actors that increasingly
manage our data and play a role on par with states in setting the scope
of privacy and speech rights. Tailored approaches are ultimately
needed. These will vary depending on the technology or general matter
being regulated, the relative dominance of the respective players, and
the applicable incentives. Each of the areas addressed in this Article,
for example, requires a slightly different approach-and each deserves
its own deep analysis and attention.
My goal here is simply to draw attention to the trends and
implications, rather than coming up with anything close to a
comprehensive solution. Critically, the key relationships between the
government and governed are changing. Speech and privacy rights are
increasingly being determined not by government actors, but by large
private actors that are accountable not just to a single government, but
to many. It is the decisions of these private actors that often determine
which government's rules apply, how these rules are interpreted, and
how much of our private data is and should be accessible to the
governments where they operate.
CONCLUSION
Our data moves across the globe without respect to territorial
boundaries. Yet governments continue to assert territorial controls.
This raises profound, and still largely unresolved, questions about what
is territorial and what is unterritorial, offers the possibility of territorial
regulation with broad extraterritorial effect, and puts the multinational
companies that manage our data in the position of mediating competing
governmental demands and approaches, and ultimately determining
the rules. These are powerful trends that require a rethinking of the

240

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1:179

enforcement jurisdictional rules that apply and a reassessment of the
relationship between the government and the governed. At least with
respect to speech and privacy rights, one's own national government
may no longer be the most important player; rather, foreign
governments and the multinational corporations that manage the
disputes across borders are increasingly setting the rules. This in turn
requires the development of new forms of accountability for the private
actors that are mediating disputes across borders and thus setting
privacy and speech rights on a global or near-global scale.

